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ARGUMENT 
A. The trial court erred in holding that when Great Basin transferred funds 
between accounts, the funds ceased to be proceeds of the Volvo-Financed 
Vehicles. 
Tellingly absent from Wells Fargofs brief is a citation to a single case holding that 
when a debtor shifts funds from one account to another, the funds cease to be proceeds 
under the lowest intermediate balance rule (LIBR). Wells Fargo also fails to present any 
reason why a transfer of funds should be treated that way, or why Volvo Finance's ability 
to enforce its security interest in proceeds — proceeds of vehicles Volvo Finance paid for 
- should be hampered because Great Basin happened to transfer those proceeds between 
accounts. Wells Fargo instead relies on statements taken out of context from a couple of 
cases generally discussing "removal" of funds from accounts, but those cases involved 
dissipation, not transfers. In addition, Wells Fargo attempts to distinguish the authority 
supporting Volvo Finance's position because they involved "wrongdoing," but as ex-
plained below, Wells Fargo's argument misconstrues the case law. Finally, Wells Fargo 
insists that the transferred funds ceased to be proceeds because Volvo Finance did not 
exert enough control over Great Basin, but this argument has nothing to do with tracing 
and runs counter to the UCC. 
The case law is clear, as are the equitable principles behind tracing in general and 
LIBR in particular: A creditor does not lose his or her claim to funds in a commingled 
account simply because the debtor changes the funds from one form to another, and this 
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includes transfers between the debtor's accounts. Nothing in Wells Fargo's brief presents 
any reason to doubt this conclusion.1 
1. The cases and other authorities Volvo Finance relies on are not 
distinguishable. 
Wells Fargo appears to assert two reasons as to why the Linco In/Brennan/Oatway2 
line of cases discussed in Volvo Finance's opening brief supposedly does not control the 
present case: that (1) the so-called "modern cases" apply LIBR without the "departure" 
Volvo Finance advocates, and (2) the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav cases involved "wrong-
doing." Wells Fargo is wrong on both accounts. 
a. Modern cases do not reject the principles espoused in Lincoln, 
Brennan, and Oatway. 
First, the so-called "modern cases" Wells Fargo cites have not rejected the Lin-
coln/Brennan/Oatwav rule. To the contrary, none of the cases Wells Fargo cites at pages 
19-20 of its brief even discussed Lincoln, Brennan, or Oatway, nor did they involve a 
debtor's transfer of funds from one account or form to another or say anything to suggest 
1
 Before delving into the specifics of Wells Fargo's arguments, Volvo Finance 
must clear up a misstatement in Wells Fargo's brief: That Volvo Finance supposedly 
does not dispute "that if LIBR's two rules are followed, it cannot trace any of its proceeds 
into the $900,000 transfer into the Concentration Account." (Wells Fargo Br. at 16.) 
This statement is false: It is Volvo Finance's position that if the actual rules of LIBR are 
followed, Volvo Finance can trace its proceeds into the December 29 transfer. Wells 
Fargo also repeatedly suggests that Volvo Finance seeks an "exception" to LIBR's rules. 
This, too, is incorrect. Volvo Finance merely asks that LIBR be applied as it always has 
been. It is Wells Fargo, not Volvo Finance, asking the Court to create an exception to 
LIBR's rules, which is why Volvo Finance is able to cite several cases supporting its 
position, while Wells Fargo is unable to cite any on-point cases of its own. 
2
 Lincoln v. Morrison, 90 N.W. 905 (Neb. 1902) (Opening Br. Add. Ex. 7); 
Brennan v. Tillinghast 201 F. 609 (6th Cir. 1913) (Opening Br. Add. Ex. 8); In re 
Oatway, 2 Ch. Div. 356 (1903) (Opening Br. Add. Ex. 9). 
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that such a transfer should be treated differently than it would under the Lincoln/Bren-
nan/Oatway rule.3 Instead, each of those cases involved the dissipation of funds, and as 
such they have no bearing on the present situation. 
Moreover, the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav rule is perfectly compatible with the 
LIBR of today, contrary to Wells Fargofs assertion that Lincoln's "general holding" has 
been rejected because modern cases "hold that merely tracing funds into a general ac-
count or showing that assets were increased is not sufficient to establish that the funds 
have been traced." (See Wells Fargo Br. at 25.) Wells Fargo appears to believe that 
Lincoln held that a beneficiary need not trace trust funds into a particular account to pre-
vail over a trustee's general creditors, but in fact, Lincoln did no such thing. See Lincoln, 
90 N.W. 905. In Lincoln, which involved a city's priority claim in a proceeding to wind 
up a failed bank, the court discussed earlier cases granting a beneficiary an automatic pre-
ference to all of an insolvent trustee's assets. See id. at 906-07. Some of these earlier 
cases had reasoned that a trustee must restore trust property first, while others reasoned 
5
 See Meyer v. Norwest Bank Iowa, 112 F.3d 946, 950-52 (8th Cir. 1997) (where 
proceeds subject to creditor's interest were deposited into account, then account was 
totally depleted by payments to parties other than the defendant bank, those funds were 
no longer traceable); Bank of Kansas v. Hutchinson Health Servs., 735 P.2d 256, 259-60 
(Kan. App. 1987) (debtor commingled secured proceeds with personal funds already in 
account, then spent thousands of dollars before bank exercised setoff; remaining balance 
was held to be traceable proceeds and bank was liable to secured creditor); In re Foster, 
275 F.3d 924, 927-28 (10th Cir. 2001) (debtor who ran Ponzi scheme transferred funds to 
one defrauded investor immediately prior to bankruptcy court's entry of order for relief; 
trustee sought to avoid transfers; court held that favored investor could not use LIBR to 
claim special interest in funds where account was largely comprised of funds taken from 
other defrauded investors); In re Edison Bros., 268 B.R. 409, 413-14 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2001) (where account was fully dissipated after deposit of secured proceeds, claimant 
could not trace funds). 
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that a trustee's use of the trust funds to pay his debts ends up benefiting the trustee's 
general estate, so that the beneficiary should be compensated out of the entire estate. Id. 
at 907. The court, however, squarely rejected those cases: "We are not able to agree to 
the rule just stated in any of the forms which it has assumed." Id. 
Instead, Lincoln expressly affirmed the two basic premises of LIBR. The court 
explained, "Whatever moneys were drawn out of that [commingled] fund and dissipated 
are presumed to be those of the bank. The portion that remains, in whatever form, is 
taken to be and represent the trust fund, and to be liable to be followed and claimed as 
such by the city." Id. at 908. This is the first presumption of LIBR and has been fol-
lowed by the Utah Supreme Court. See Tooele County Bd. of Educ. v. Hadlock, 79 Utah 
478, 11 P.2d 320, 325 (1932) ("The law presumes that trust funds were not appropriated 
and that a balance of cash in the hands of the depositary is the trust funds."),, Lincoln also 
states that "if the whole of the cash on hand into which the city's money entered, or a 
greater portion thereof than that representing the bank's own money, was used in paying 
off other depositors or in running expenses, the city is not entitled to a preference over 
general creditors for the amount of its money so lost." Lincoln, 90 N.W. at 908. This is 
the second presumption of LIBR and is also consistent with Utah law. See Hadlock, 11 
P.2d at 325.4 There is simply no basis for Wells Fargo's suggestion that the principles 
applied in Lincoln have fallen out of favor.5 
4
 As stated in Hadlock, 11 P.2d at 325 (emphasis added): "[I]f, at any time during 
the currency of the commingled account, the amounts drawn out leave a balance less than 
the amount of the trust money, the trust money must be regarded as dissipated to that 
extent, leaving the trust to be impressed only on the smallest balance that appears to have 
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b. The Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav cases cannot be distinguished on the 
basis of "wrongdoing." 
Wells Fargo's attempt to distinguish Volvo Finance's cases by claiming that they 
involved "conscious wrongdoing on the part of the holder of the funds" is even less 
compelling. (See Wells Fargo Br. at 21.) Nothing in the holdings or reasoning of the 
cases suggests that their application of tracing principles was based on the desire to 
punish wrongdoing. Moreover, given the dynamics of these cases, it defies logic to 
suggest that the results were driven by such a motive. 
Wells Fargo's entire argument is based on a fundamental misreading of the Lin-
coln/Brennan/Oatway cases. Wells Fargo contends that the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway 
cases no longer apply because modern cases "most often deal with two innocent parties, 
as here." (Wells Fargo Br. at 20.) Even if Wells Fargo's claim of innocence were true,6 
been on hand at any time during such period. The sums subsequently added to the 
account from other sources cannot be attributed to the trust money." 
5
 Wells Fargo is simply wrong to assert that the Lincoln court failed to do a LIBR 
analysis; to the contrary, the very first paragraph of the opinion carefully details what 
balance was in the failed bank's account after the city deposited its funds, what happened 
to the funds in the account after the city's deposit, and what funds were in the account 
when the bank failed. See Lincoln, 90 N.W. at 906. 
Similarly, Wells Fargo misses the point when it asserts that Lincoln's approach 
was rejected in the "modern" case of In re Winkle, 128 B.R. 529, 535 (S.D. Ohio 1991). 
The reasoning and holding of Lincoln are perfectly consistent with Winkle's statement 
that funds must be traceable to "identifiable trust assets, and not merely to general funds 
of the debtor." Id 
6
 Wells Fargo's claim to "innocence," of course, is suspect: Regardless of whether 
Wells Fargo acted with willful malfeasance, the record shows that Wells Fargo chose to 
advance money to Great Basin knowing that Great Basin would likely be repaying those 
advances with proceeds of truck sales subject to Volvo Finance's security interest. (See 
R. 604, 694, 1004-05, 1106-07.) The record also shows that Wells Fargo did not 
investigate Great Basin's financial condition or the status of Great Basin's accounts with 
Volvo Finance or any of the 35 other creditors disclosed by the UCC-1 records. (See id.) 
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that would not distinguish the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway cases, because each of those 
cases ultimately dealt with a dispute between two "innocent" parties. 
The Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav cases (like most creditor-vs.-creditor priority dis-
putes) all followed the same basic pattern. Three actors were involved: a debtor, a 
special creditor (secured creditor or trust beneficiary), and a general creditor (or a set of 
general creditors). In each case, the debtor was defunct, with assets insufficient to satisfy 
all creditors (otherwise priority would have been irrelevant). Thus, in each case a court 
had to decide between awarding the special creditor priority to the debtor's limited assets 
or leaving the special creditor to share in the remnants of the debtor's estate. As Wells 
Fargo points out, the special creditor and the general creditors are usually both "innocent 
parties"; consequently, no matter which way the court ruled, the decision would prejudice 
an innocent party. 
A comparison of Wells Fargo's brief and the Brennan case highlights some of the 
problems with Wells Fargo's "wrongdoing" theory. See Brennan, 201 F. 609. In Bren-
nan, the Ironwood Bank had failed and a receiver was appointed. Id at 611. Wells Fargo 
suggests that the dispute was between the depositor and the bank, and that the court held 
that the plaintiff "should prevail over the conscious wrongdoer, Ironwood" (Wells Fargo 
Br. at 22), but this is factually incorrect. The dispute was actually between the plaintiff, 
whose stock the bank had wrongfully sold, i.e., the special creditor, and a receiver ap-
pointed to represent the general creditors. See 201 F. at 611-12. Moreover, the Brennan 
court said nothing to suggest that someone's wrongdoing affected how the tracing rules 
were applied. Finally, there is no basis to ascribe such a motive to the court, since the 
parties that lost, i.e., the general creditors, had not engaged in any wrongdoing. The bank 
itself may have engaged in wrongdoing by selling the plaintiffs stock, but the bank, be-
ing defunct, had no stake in the outcome. (Wells Fargofs statement that "the court refused 
to apply the neutral rules of LIBR to the benefit of the wrongdoer" (Wells Fargo Br. at 
22) is also wrong; had the court ruled the other way, the beneficiary of that decision 
would have been the general creditors, not the bank.) 
Lincoln, 90 N.W. 905, is very similar to Brennan. The dispute was between the 
city (special creditor), whose agent had made an unauthorized loan to the bank, and a 
receiver acting for the failed bank's general creditors. Id, at 906. As in Brennan, the 
bank was defunct, the court did not say that its application of tracing principles was moti-
vated by the wrongdoing of one of the parties, and the losing general creditors had not 
engaged in any wrongdoing. 
Finally, in Oatway, the "wrongdoer," i.e., the trustee who had breached the trust, 
had died. See 2 Ch. Div. at 356-57. Obviously, the court was not going to be able to 
punish him. Oatway was a creditor's action for administration of his estate, and the court 
had to decide between competing claims by the beneficiaries of a trust the decedent had 
breached, the special creditors, and the decedent's general creditors and/or heirs. Id. As 
with the other cases, the court ruled in favor of the special creditor even though there was 
no suggestion that the decedent's creditors or heirs had done anything wrong. Thus, 
nothing in the reasoning or the result of these cases supports Wells Fargo's theory that the 
tracing rules were applied in a unique way because of a concern about "wrongdoing.' 
2. Wells Fargo's claim that Volvo Finance allegedly failed to protect its 
collateral does not justify the trial court's departure from the longstanding 
rules of LIBR. 
The Court should reject Wells Fargo's argument that it would be improper to trace 
funds according to the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway principles because Wells Fargo was 
merely an innocent transferee, while Volvo Finance supposedly did not do enough to pro-
tect its collateral. This argument fails for three reasons: First, the argument has nothing 
to do with tracing, but instead involves substantive issues of priority. Second, the UCC 
relieves Volvo Finance of any obligation to police Great Basin's use of collateral. Third, 
Wells Fargo has not established that Volvo Finance failed to use proper diligence in its 
dealings with Great Basin. 
a. Even if Wells Fargo's argument had merit, the argument would not 
affect the application of LIBR. 
First, Wells Fargo's argument is misplaced because it conflates the issue of tracing 
with the issue of priority. Wells Fargo has presented no reason why tracing rules should 
be applied differently depending on a court's determination as to which creditor was more 
or less culpable for a debtor's default. Wells Fargo's cases do not suggest that the tracing 
7
 To the extent the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway cases involved "wrongdoing," they 
involved wrongdoing by the debtor. And here, Great Basin clearly engaged in wrong-
doing. Violating its agreements with Volvo Finance, agreements that made Great Basin a 
trustee over sales proceeds for Volvo Finance's benefit (see R. 541), Great Basin failed to 
immediately remit to Volvo Finance the balance owed on each truck that Great Basin 
sold. Instead, Great Basin kept the funds for its own use. Great Basin thus engaged in 
the same wrongdoing as did the debtor/trustees in Lincoln, Brennan, and Oatway. Wells 
Fargo may or may not have engaged in deliberate malfeasance, but as explained in the 
text, neither did the general creditors in the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway cases. 
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rules should be applied one way if the general creditor is more at fault than the special 
creditor, but another way if the special creditor is more at fault. Indeed, it would be utter 
chaos if the tracing rules depended on a court's assessment of the parties1 efforts in each 
particular case. Adopting such an approach would frustrate the UCCs purpose of 
achieving uniformity and reliability in commercial transactions.8 
Wells Fargo sought summary judgment on the ground that the December 21-22 
transfer of $2 million should be deemed to have included non-proceeds first, leaving no 
proceeds to be transferred back to the Concentration Account on December 29. Wells 
Fargo's motion was based on the tracing analysis prepared by its expert, Derk Rasmussen. 
This analysis purported to apply the rules of LIBR as Mr. Rasmussen contended they 
should be applied; none of the figures on his analysis, or on the analysis prepared by 
Volvo Finance's expert David Judd, depended on who was more "at fault." 
Under the positions presented in this case, the $2 million transferred on December 
21-22 either included $1,791,919 in proceeds or $1,066,584 in proceeds. (See generally 
Volvo Finance Opening Br. at 20-25.) Depending on the answer to that question, the 
amount of proceeds in the First Security Account on December 29 was either $3,707,516 
or $2,982,181, and the transfer back to the Concentration Account included either 
8
 Wells Fargo has asserted in another context that the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway 
rule should not be followed here because it might be difficult to distinguish between a 
transfer "intended for dissipation" from a "regular" transfer. (See Wells Fargo Br. at 21 
n.10.) Wells Fargo, once again, is either missing, or misstating, the point. The rule as it 
has existed for a century has nothing to do with the debtor's intent, but with whether the 
debtor maintains possession of the funds. But even if intent were an issue, the difficulties 
posed to the tracing regime by determining intent would pale in comparison to the 
difficulties posed by determining which of two creditors is more responsible for losses 
caused by the debtor. 
_ o _ 
$693,132 in proceeds or $0 in proceeds. (See id. at 24.) There is no reason why the 
answer to these questions should depend on whether Volvo Finance took adequate steps 
to protect its collateral or whether Wells Fargo should have investigated Great Basin's 
financial condition before making an $800,000+ unsecured loan. If in fact Wells Fargo 
received proceeds in which Volvo Finance had a security interest (which Wells Fargo 
did, under Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway), then the issue of whether Wells Fargo or Volvo 
Finance has a higher claim to those proceeds is a matter of priority law under the UCC. 
b. Volvo Finance had no obligation to police Great Basin's use of the 
trucks or the proceeds. 
The Utah Code clearly states that a creditor has no obligation to restrict a debtor's 
use of collateral: 
A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors by reason of 
liberty in the debtor to use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the 
collateral.. . or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by reason of 
the failure of the secured party to require the debtor to account for proceeds 
or replace collateral. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-205 (2000) (emphasis added). As Volvo Finance explained in 
its opening brief, ff[t]he purpose of the provision is to relieve creditors from the age-old 
requirement of policing collateral in the hands of a debtor." Inslev Mfg. Corp. v. Draper 
Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1986). Thus, a secured creditor may refrain from 
"policing" collateral, and may grant the debtor control over secured proceeds without 
weakening its security interest. Miracle Feeds v. Attica Dairy Farm, 385 N.W.2d 208, 
210 (Wis. App. 1986). See also J.R. Simplot Co. v. Sales King Int'l 2000 UT 92, ffl[ 43-
45, 17 P.3d 1100 (creditor has no duty to require periodic payments). Volvo Finance had 
_ m _ 
no duty to either "monitor" Great Basin's use of proceeds or to require Great Basin to 
segregate those proceeds from other funds. 
c. Volvo Finance acted reasonably and prudently; at the very least, 
even if the issue were relevant fact questions would render summary 
judgment inappropriate. 
Finally, there is no basis for Wells Fargo's suggestion that Volvo Finance failed to 
take proper steps to protect its collateral. As Wells Fargo!s brief acknowledges, Volvo 
Finance sent a notice of default to Great Basin on December 8, 2000, demanding 
payment of all sums owed to Volvo Finance. (See Wells Fargo Br. at 7.) On December 
20, Volvo Finance notified Great Basin that Volvo Finance was suspending Great Basin's 
lines of credit and notifying all manufacturers of that step, and that all future transactions 
would require payment by certified check or the equivalent before Volvo Finance would 
release any certificates of origin or titles for Great Basin's trucks. (Id.; R. 1036, 1075.) 
On December 21 and 22, Volvo Finance sent written notices to all known account 
debtors of Great Basin who had bought Volvo-Financed Vehicles, directing them to make 
future payments directly to Volvo Finance. (Wells Fargo Br. at 7.) Volvo Finance also 
sent notice to Zions Bank asking Zions to segregate sales proceeds and hold them for 
Volvo Finance's benefit. (Id.)9 
9
 Wells Fargo's assertion that Volvo Finance did not suspend Great Basin's line of 
credit (Wells Fargo Br. at 29) is unsupported by the record. Further, Wells Fargo's state-
ment that Volvo Finance did not ask Great Basin to segregate funds is misleading; the 
Financing Agreements required Great Basin to immediately remit sales proceeds to 
Volvo Finance (R. 540), so there would be no need for "segregation." Wells Fargo's 
statement that Volvo Finance did not require direct payment from Great Basin's buyers is 
also misleading. In late October 2000, Volvo Finance took possession of all Manu-
facturer's Statements of Origin ("MSOs") and vehicle titles for all collateral, and notified 
- i i -
Wells Fargo argues that Volvo Finance did not notify Wells Fargo about its 
problems with Great Basin, and instead "allowed" Great Basin to deposit sales proceeds 
into the Concentration Account (Wells Fargo Br. at 29), but Wells Fargo fails to tell the 
Court that Volvo Finance was unaware that Great Basin had any accounts with Wells 
Fargo. (R. 1123.) Volvo Finance was thus at a serious disadvantage relative to Wells 
Fargo: Wells Fargo knew about Volvo Finance, but Volvo Finance did not know about 
Wells Fargo.10 
The only thing Volvo Finance did not do was physically repossess its inventory 
from all the Great Basin dealerships prior to the bankruptcy filing. But the record con-
tains no evidence suggesting that the circumstances at the time justified taking such a 
drastic step, or that taking such action was even commercially reasonable.11 
Finally, even if the issue of Volvo Finance's alleged negligence were relevant to 
the tracing issue, the trial court's judgment would have to be reversed, because Wells 
Fargo has not established as a matter of law that Volvo Finance was negligent. Once 
Volvo Trucks North America to send Volvo Finance all MSOs on any additional vehicles 
bound for Great Basin. (R. 1033.) Volvo Finance then required Great Basin to furnish 
detailed information concerning each truck sale before Volvo Finance would release the 
MSO and title to Great Basin's customers. (Id.) There was simply no other way for 
Volvo Finance to prevent Great Basin from selling trucks to customers without Volvo 
Finance's knowledge, short of taking physical possession of the trucks. 
10
 Wells Fargo suggests that Volvo Finance "cannot claim that it was not aware of 
Great Basin's banking relationship with Wells Fargo" because fine print on some of Great 
Basin's checks said that the checks were drawn on Wachovia Bank N.A. "in cooperation 
with & Payable if Desired at Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." (Wells Fargo Br. at 6 n.4.) This 
is absurd. There is no basis to conclude that this reference on fine print on checks 
received in Volvo Finance's receivables department would give notice to the entire 
company that Great Basin was depositing sales proceeds into accounts with Wells Fargo. 
11
 In November 2000, Volvo Finance had contacted Zions Bank and was told that 
Great Basin's loans and line of credit with Zions were in good standing. (R. 1034.) 
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again, the record contains no evidence as to what actions would or would not have been 
commercially reasonable at the time; Wells Fargo merely asks the Court to speculate that 
it was unreasonable for Volvo Finance to allow Great Basin to maintain possession of its 
collateral. Since this is an appeal from summary judgment granted to Wells Fargo, Wells 
Fargo's failure to establish a right to judgment as a matter of law means that the summary 
judgment cannot be upheld on this basis. 
3. Great Basin did not "dissipate" the funds by transferring them to the 
Concentration Account where Wells Fargo seized them. 
Wells Fargo appears to contend that LIBR should not be applied in accordance 
with the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav cases because the funds were no longer in possession 
of the debtor or are no longer "in existence." (See Wells Fargo Br. at 30-31.) It is 
difficult to understand precisely what Wells Fargo is claiming. Wells Fargo may be 
asserting that Volvo Financed security interest was defeated by Wells Fargofs seizure of 
the funds from the Concentration Account. (See, e.g.. Wells Fargo Br. at 31 n.18 (sug-
gesting that Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav cases are distinguishable because the funds were 
still in the trustee's possession).) If Wells Fargo were correct that a bank's seizure or 
receipt of proceeds "dissipates" the funds under LIBR, however, then no creditor could 
ever bring a conversion claim in such a case. This is obviously not the case, since the law 
is clear that even in the "modern" context, a secured creditor can use LIBR to pursue a 
conversion claim against a junior creditor that has received proceeds. Indeed, Wells 
Fargo cited at least one such case. See Bank of Kansas v. Hutchinson, 735 P.2d 256 
(Kan. App. 1987). 
. n-
In Bank of Kansas, the debtor commingled secured proceeds and its own funds in 
its general checking account. See id. at 257-58. Over the next two weeks, most of the 
account was dissipated; the bank then declared itself insecure on other loans owed by the 
debtor and set off the remaining balance of the account. The court concluded that under 
LIBR, the funds remaining in the debtor's account at the time of setoff were proceeds 
subject to the secured creditor's interest, and the setting off bank was liable to pay the ac-
count balance to the secured creditor. Id. at 259-61. In Bank of Kansas, as in the present 
case, the funds had been taken by the debtor's bank before the secured creditor brought its 
claim, but the secured creditor prevailed nonetheless. See also C & H Farm Serv. v. 
Farmers Sav. Bank, 449 N.W.2d 866, 877 (Iowa 1989) (holding that LIBR tracing 
principles apply notwithstanding argument that bank's seizure of funds to repay overdraft 
balance rendered proceeds unidentifiable). 
Revised Article 9, in effect in Utah since 2001, expressly recognizes that a secured 
creditor may use LIBR's tracing principles to establish a claim to proceeds received by 
another. Section 9-315 states that commingled proceeds are "identifiable" if the secured 
party "identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application of equitable 
principles:' Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-315(2)(b) (emphasis added) The Official Com-
ment explains that this section "permits the use of whatever methods of tracing other law 
permits with respect to the type of property involved. Among the 'equitable principles1 
whose use other law may permit is the 'lowest intermediate balance rule.' See Restate-
ment (2d) Trusts § 202" Id, cmt. 3 (emphasis added). Section 202 of the Restatement of 
Trusts, as cited in Volvo Finance's opening brief, incorporates the Lincoln/Brennan/Oat-
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way rule. See Restatement (2d) Trusts § 202 (1959) (Add. Ex. 11 hereto), especially cmt. 
i;12 see also id. cmts. h, j , 1. Revised Article 9 is obviously "modem" authority, and it 
clearly supports the use of LIBR, including the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatwav rule, to support 
a senior creditor's claim. 
This is a conversion and unjust enrichment case: Volvo Finance contends that 
when Great Basin transferred the $900,000 to the Concentration Account on December 
29, some of those funds were subject to Volvo Finance's security interest. When Wells 
Fargo seized those funds, Wells Fargo exercised dominion and control over them in a 
manner inconsistent with Volvo Finance's interest. Therefore, Wells Fargo committed a 
conversion and was unjustly enriched. These principles operate the same regardless of 
whether the debtor deposits proceeds directly into an account immediately before they are 
seized, as in Insley; whether the debtor deposits proceeds into an account and they remain 
for two weeks, as in Bank of Kansas; or whether the debtor deposits them into the 
account and transfers them to another account and back, as in the present case. 
Regarding whether the funds are "no longer in existence," the funds certainly were 
in existence when Wells Fargo seized them. If anyone dissipated them, it was Wells 
Fargo. Cf C & H, 449 N.W.2d at 877 ("The proceeds were not made unidentifiable by 
12
 The pertinent portion of comment i states as follows (with emphasis added): 
"The beneficiary's lien is not restricted to any part of the deposit but extends to the whole 
deposit and can be enforced against any part of the funds remaining on deposit and 
against any funds which are withdrawn, so long as they can be traced. So also, there is 
no inference that the trustee withdraws his own funds first If the funds withdrawn are 
preserved or can be traced, the beneficiary can enforce an equitable lien upon them or 
their product, even though the funds remaining on deposit are subsequently dis-
sipated." 
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the bank's setoff; the bank now holds them for its own benefit."). The issue raised by 
Volvo Finance's claims is whether Wells Fargo exercised dominion and control over 
funds in which Volvo Finance had an interest on December 29, 2000, not what Wells 
Fargo has done with those funds since then.13 
On the other hand, Wells Fargo may be contending that the funds were dissipated 
because the NSF items that Wells Fargo paid were used for Great Basin's various 
business expenses. If this is Wells Fargo's argument, then Wells Fargo is misunder-
standing the events of December 27-29. As explained in more detail in Volvo Finance's 
opening brief (pp. 8-9), it was Wells Fargo, not Great Basin, that paid the NSF items on 
December 27 and 28, advancing approximately $828,000 of Wells Fargo's own funds. 
Then, on December 29, Great Basin transferred the $900,000 into the Concentration 
Account, but instead of making that amount available for Great Basin's use, Wells Fargo 
set off the amount of the deposit against the amount Great Basin owed for the advances. 
Wells Fargo's suggestion that Great Basin dissipated the funds to cover business expenses 
is wrong: Wells Fargo paid the items at issue on December 27 and 28, and seized the 
The Court can also reject Wells Fargo's contention that it would be unfair to 
apply LIBR according to the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway cases, because some of the items 
Wells Fargo paid went to Volvo Trucks, whom Wells Fargo describes as a "sister com-
pany." (Wells Fargo Br. at 29-30.) Wells Fargo presented no evidence below that Volvo 
Trucks North America was a "sister company" of Volvo Finance. To the contrary, Volvo 
Finance is a completely distinct company from Volvo Trucks North America (VTNA). 
(See R. 1380, ]f 6.) Volvo Finance provides financing to dealers and customers; VTNA 
sells trucks, parts, warranties, and other related products. Volvo Finance and VTNA 
have separate management. VTNA had no security interest in the vehicles that Volvo 
Finance financed for Great Basin. A dealer's obligations to VTNA would be entirely 
separate from its obligations to Volvo Finance. (Id.) Moreover, any payments Great 
Basin made to VTNA are unrelated to the proceeds from the 53 Volvo-Financed Vehicles 
Great Basin transferred into its Wells Fargo accounts. (See id.) 
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funds, including Volvo Finance's proceeds, from the Concentration Account two days 
later. 
4. The Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule is the only one faithful to the principles 
and purposes of LIBR. 
As shown in the preceding sections, the law is clear that under the cases, Restate-
ments, and other authorities, a debtor's transfer of funds from one account to another, or 
from one form to another, does not defeat a creditor's claim to those funds. Wells Fargo's 
arguments as to why that authority does not apply are simply unpersuasive. Moreover, 
Wells Fargo has not presented any reason why the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway rule should 
be disregarded in this case, i.e., why a debtor's transfer of funds between accounts should 
be deemed to include non-proceeds first. 
LIBR is based on the presumption that the trustee acts honestly and thus keeps the 
beneficiary's funds inviolate to the greatest extent possible. See Hadlock, 11 P.2d at 325. 
Here, at all pertinent times, Great Basin always kept a greater amount of funds in its 
possession than the amount Volvo Finance claims as proceeds.14 (See Tracing Analysis, 
Opening Br. Add. Ex. 2.) Thus, under the reasoning of Hadlock, there is no reason to 
think that the proceeds balance was diminished when Great Basin transferred funds 
between accounts. Upholding the trial court's application of LIBR would be inconsistent 
with the basis of LIBR itself, would defeat the purposes of LIBR, and would conflict with 
Hadlock, the Lincoln/Brennan/Oatway cases, and the other authorities Volvo Finance has 
14
 From December 7 through 21, the Concentration Account balance always 
equaled or exceeded the proceeds balance. From December 22 until December 29, the 
balance transferred to and retained in the First Security Account exceeded the proceeds 
balance. 
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discussed. Volvo Finance respectfully submits that the Court should not disregard such 
authority without a compelling reason, and Wells Fargo has failed to present one. The 
Court should therefore reverse the trial court's ruling that Great Basin's transfer of 
$900,000 on December 29, 2000, did not include any proceeds generated by the sale of 
the Volvo-Financed Vehicles. 
B, Revised Article 9 does not retroactively relieve Wells Fargo from liability for 
a conversion that took place before the Revised Article became effective. 
The Court should disregard Wells Fargo's half-hearted request to uphold the trial 
court's judgment on the ground that this case is controlled by Revised Article 9. As 
Volvo Finance explained in its opening brief, the Utah Code expressly states that "if the 
relative priorities of the claims were established before this act takes effect, former Chap-
ter 9 determines priority." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l). The purpose of this statute 
was to ensure that the Revised Article did not affect conflicting claims to the same col-
lateral. See Interbusiness Bank v. First Nat'l Bank of Mifflintown, 318 F. Supp. 2d 230, 
238 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (emphasis added) ("This section functions as a grandfather clause, 
protecting interests that enjoyed priority under former Article 9 but would lose that status 
under the revised provisions.")15 
13
 See also In re New Haven Foundry, 285 B.R. 646, 649 (Bankr. E. D. Mich. 
2002) (former Article 9 governed a dispute between a creditor claiming setoff rights that 
accrued in 1999 and a creditor who obtained a security interest in April 2001: "Thus, the 
relative priorities were established before the July 1, 2001, effective date of Revised 
Article 9 in Michigan, and therefore the Revised Article 9 does not apply."); Con-
solidated Nutrition v. IBP, Inc.. 669 N.W.2d 126, 132 (S.D. 2003) (where creditor 
claimed funds as setoff in April 2001, dispute between that creditor and financer with 
1998 financing statement was decided under former Article 9); In re Chorney, 277 B.R. 
477, 486 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2002) (priority dispute between creditor's rights based on 
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Wells Fargo's only response to this is to deny that this case involves a priority 
dispute because Wells Fargo "does not claim a priority to the funds in question." (Wells 
Fargo Br. at 36.) First, this is flatly untrue; at least three of the affirmative defenses in 
Wells Fargo's Amended Answer assert that Wells Fargo had a "superior interest in the 
funds" at issue. (R. 76 (Defenses 3-5).) Second, Wells Fargo is being too cute. Volvo 
Finance asserts that Wells Fargo is liable for conversion because Volvo Finance had a 
greater right to the funds than Wells Fargo did. Wells Fargo disputes this. Thus, to re-
solve the case, the Court will have to determine the "relative priorities" of Volvo Finance 
and Wells Fargo in those funds. And because the parties1 relative priorities were es-
tablished on December 29, 2000, six months before the Revised Article took effect, then 
"former Chapter 9 determines priority."16 Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9a-709(l). 
Once again, Wells Fargo's position is illogical. As explained in Volvo Finance's 
opening brief, the Revised Article gave creditors until July 2001 to take the extra steps 
required to perfect interests in proceeds held in a checking account. Therefore, it makes 
November 1999 financing statement and bankruptcy trustee's rights based on October 
2000 filing governed by former Article 9); Fifth Third Bank v. Comark, 794 N.E.2d 433, 
438 (Ind. App. 2003) (dispute between creditors, both relying on financing statements 
filed in 2000, governed by former Article 9). 
16
 Wells Fargo is wrong when it attempts to distinguish Interbusiness Bank. The 
facts in Interbusiness Bank were very similar to the facts here: The defendant seized 
funds from a debtor that owed it money, and the plaintiff asserted that the defendant's 
actions interfered with the plaintiffs superior perfected security interest. Indeed, the 
defendant in Interbusiness Bank actually seized the debtor's funds after July 1, 2001, yet 
the court held that the former Article applied. See 318 F. Supp. 2d at 238-39. The 
defendant in Interbusiness Bank based its claim on a perfected security interest rather 
than as an innocent transferee, but it would be absurd to conclude that whether the statute 
applies retroactively depends on the particular justification a defendant gives for its 
seizure of the funds. See also Consolidated Nutrition, 669 N.W.2d at 132 (plaintiff sued 
to recover proceeds paid to other creditor). 
_ 10 
no sense for the Revised Article to apply to events that took place in December 2000. It 
also makes no sense to say that Wells Fargo's actions constituted a conversion, for which 
Wells Fargo was liable from December 29, 2000, through June 30, 2001, but that Wells 
Fargo was relieved of this liability on July 1, 2001. Indeed, one must question Wells 
Fargo's good faith in asserting that the case is governed by the Revised Article, since 
Wells Fargo's own Amended Answer cites the Former Article as authority for three of its 
affirmative defenses yet does not even mention the Revised Article. (R. 78-79 (Defenses 
14-16).) There is no basis to conclude that the Revised Article applies, and as such it 
would be inappropriate to uphold the trial court's judgment based on the Revised Article. 
C. Wells Fargo has not established that the "ordinary course" defense bars 
Volvo Finance's claim as a matter of law. 
1. As a matter of law. Wells Fargo cannot rely on the purported defense. 
a. Ins lev precludes the defense in a case like this. 
As it did before the trial court, Wells Fargo asks the Court to hold that because 
Wells Fargo did not have actual knowledge of Great Basin's default to Volvo Finance, 
Wells Fargo cannot be liable for conversion under the "ordinary course" defense of Com-
ment 2(c) to Former UCC § 9-306. There is simply no way, however, for this Court to 
apply the "ordinary course" defense and remain faithful to Insley. As explained in Volvo 
Finance's opening brief, the facts of this case are functionally identical to those of Insley. 
Further, the reasoning and policy decisions expressed in the out-of-state cases Wells 
Fargo relies on are fundamentally inconsistent with the reasoning and policy decisions 
expressed in Insley. As the Court is bound by Insley, the Court must reject Wells Fargo's 
attempt to avoid liability under the "ordinary course" defense. 
Neither J.I. Case Credit Corp. v. First National Bank, 991 F.2d 1272 (7th Cir. 
1993), nor Textron Financial Corp. v. Firstar Bank Wisconsin, 579 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. 
App. 1998), supports the defense here. Notably, neither court actually addressed whether 
Comment 2(c) actually furnishes a defense against a conversion claim; instead, the point 
was conceded in both cases. See J.I. Case, 991 F.2d at 1276 ("Both the Bank and Case 
agree, based on language in Citizens Nat'l Bank, that Indiana has recognized Comment 
2(c) as an exception to the Code's general priority rules."); Textron, 579 N.W.2d at 51 
("[I]n light of Textronfs failure to raise this issue, for purposes of this case we will assume 
that the comment alone can support an exception to the Code's general priority rules."). 
Thus, Wells Fargo's reliance on these cases begs the question, which is whether Com-
ment 2(c) provides a defense to a bank who seizes a creditor's proceeds. 
Further, both cases are factually distinguishable, in that neither case involved a 
bank's seizure of funds from a debtor's account to repay overdraft advances. In J.L Case, 
the debtor financed a used car business through the bank and had "several other loans" 
from the bank, and the debtor paid the bank by checks drawn on his business checking 
account. 991 F.2d at 1273-74. The Seventh Circuit expressly relied on this fact in hol-
ding that the ordinary course defense applied: "Unlike the bank in Citizens National 
Bank, which unilaterally took deposited funds by way of set-offs, the Bank here received 
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checks drawn on Humphrey's business account." Id. at 1276.17 In Textron, the debtor 
had pre-existing loans from the bank secured by all the debtor's assets except those 
specifically pledged elsewhere, and the bank "recovered" funds from the debtor's account 
to be applied to one of the delinquent loans. 579 N.W.2d at 584-85.18 
More importantly, however, J.I. Case and Textron are based on premises that flatly 
contradict Insley. Both cases grant a bank an absolute right to keep proceeds received 
from a debtor, even in the face of a superior perfected security interest, if the bank did not 
have actual knowledge that the funds were subject to the creditor's interest, or at least if 
the bank was not "reckless." Under these cases, a UCC-1 filing is not sufficient to protect 
a creditor's security interest in proceeds against a bank that seizes the proceeds from the 
debtor's account. This reasoning, however, flies in the face of Inslev's holding that "[a] 
secured party should be able to rely on his compliance with the Code's requirements for 
perfection and his search of the record as against an unrecorded interest of a setting-off 
bank.11 Id at 1346 (emphasis added).19 
Citizens National Bank, discussed later in the text, was one of the key cases on 
which Insley relied. See Insley, 717 P.2d at 1346 (citing Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Mid-
States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Ind. App. 1978)). 
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In footnote 23, Wells Fargo cites two additional "ordinary course" cases. Just 
like the cases discussed in the text, neither case involved a bank's seizure of funds from a 
deposit account to repay overdraft advances. See ITT Comm. Fin. Corp. v. Bank of the 
West 166 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 1999) (debtor made payments by check on pre-existing 
loans secured by debtor's collateral); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. State of New York, 641 
N.Y.S.2d 742 (App. Div. 1996) (debtor made payments by check to State for pre-existing 
sales tax liability). 
19
 Wells Fargo incorrectly suggests that the Utah Supreme Court's subsequent dis-
cussion in Simplot leaves the issue open. See J.R. Simplot, 2000 UT 92. In fact, Simplot 
further demonstrates the inherent conflict between Insley and the ordinary course de-
fense. In Simplot, the court rejected the ordinary course defense because the situation 
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Recognizing this problem, Wells Fargo attempts to distinguish Inslev by denying 
that the present situation involves a "setoff." Any attempt to distinguish Inslev is futile, 
however. In Inslev, the bank advanced funds to cover the debtor's overdrafts, the debtor 
deposited proceeds into the account, and the bank subtracted the amount of the advance 
from the deposited amount in determining what funds the debtor had available. Here, 
Wells Fargo advanced funds to cover Great Basin's overdrafts, Great Basin deposited 
$900,000 into the Concentration Account, and Wells Fargo subtracted the amount of the 
advance from the deposited amount in determining what funds Great Basin had available. 
Wells Fargo's actions were no different from the bank's in Inslev. 
Wells Fargo cannot legitimately deny that it exercised a setoff. Indeed, before the 
trial court, Wells Fargo denied liability on the ground that Wells Fargo had both a 
"common law right of setoff and a "contractual right of setoff." (See R. 76 (Defenses 4-
5).) Further, Wells Fargo's actions were the very epitome of a setoff. 
A "setoff is what happens when one party uses a debt owed to him to "cancel out" 
all or part of a debt he owes to another. See In re Myers, 362 F.3d 667, 672 (10th Cir. 
2004) (internal quotation and citation omitted) ("The right of setoff allows entities that 
owe each other money to apply their mutual debts against each other, thereby avoiding 
the absurdity of making A pay B when B owes A."). When a customer deposits funds, 
the bank essentially owes a debt to the customer for the amount of that deposit; this "cre-
dit" is what obligates the bank to allow withdrawals or pay checks presented for payment. 
"closely resemble[d] a conflict between a perfected security interest and a right of setoff." 
Id. Tf 42. As in Simplot this case clearly "closely resembles" the same conflict. 
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See, e.g., Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995) (acceptance of 
deposit "consists of nothing more or less than a promise to pay, from the bank to the 
depositor11). Therefore, when Great Basin wired the $900,000 into the Concentration 
Account, Wells Fargo owed Great Basin $900,000, while at that time, Great Basin owed 
Wells Fargo $828,951.36 for the overdraft advances. The bank used Great Basin's debt 
to it to "cancel out" most of the bank's obligation to Great Basin, making only $71,000+ 
available. (See Volvo Finance Opening Br. Add. Ex. 3, at 8.) This is plainly a setoff.20 
At any rate, whether Wells Fargo's actions can be labeled a "setoff is not the 
ultimate issue; the real issue is whether Wells Fargo's actions differed from the bank's 
actions in Insley in any appreciable way. They clearly did not. Wells Fargo appears to 
claim that the setoff in Insley was "involuntary," while the setoff in the present case was 
"voluntary," but there is no basis for drawing such a distinction. In Insley, as in the pre-
20
 See, e.g.. Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 315 P.2d 
653, 657 (Utah 1957) ("[W]hen a depositor is indebted to a bank and the debts are mutual 
-- that is, between the same parties and in the same right — the bank may apply the 
deposit, to the payment of the debt due it by the depositor, provided there is no express 
agreement to the contrary and the deposit is not specifically applicable to some other 
particular purpose."); 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks & Fin. Inst. § 865, at 702 (2d ed. 1997) 
("While this right [to apply a customer's deposit to a debt] has been called a lien, this 
right of a bank with respect to general deposits is more accurately a right of setoff, for it 
rests upon, and is coextensive with, the right to set off as to mutual demands.") (emphasis 
added); C&H, 449 N.W.2d at 876 ("It is a common setoff situation, whereby the bank 
attempted to recover Schellhorns' debt to it (from the payment of overdrafts) by offsetting 
that debt against its own debt to Schellhorns (from the deposit of grain proceeds)."). 
Wells Fargo also claims in its brief that a setoff requires "separate transactions." 
(See Wells Fargo Br. at 33 n.19 (citing Mark VII Fin. Consultants v. Smedley, 792 P.2d 
130, 132 (Utah App. 1990).) Once again, one must question Wells Fargo's good faith in 
raising this argument. As even a cursory glance at Mark VII reveals, the court there was 
discussing the term "setoff as it was used in impleading context, i.e., setoff vs. recoup-
ment. See 792 P.2d at 132-33. That issue has absolutely nothing to do with Insley, or 
with this case. 
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sent case, the debtor willingly deposited funds into his overdrawn account, and the bank 
subtracted the overdraft amount from the amount of the deposit. Because it is universal 
practice for a bank to take a setoff in this situation, the debtor in Inslev obviously "con-
sented" to it: "A general deposit... made when the deposit account is overdrawn[] 
raises an implied consent to the application of the deposit to such overdraft or obliga-
tion." 10 Am. Jur. 2d Banks & Fin. Inst. § 865, at 702 (2d ed. 1997) (emphasis added). 
In other words, everyone knows that when one deposits funds into an overdrawn account, 
the bank will subtract the overdraft from the deposit. There is no reason to think that the 
deposit and setoff in Inslev were any less voluntary than the deposit and setoff in the 
present case.21 
Further, Wells Fargo has not explained why it should matter whether the seizure 
of funds is deemed "voluntary." The purpose behind Inslev was to further certainty and 
efficiency in commercial transactions by relieving creditors of the obligation to police a 
debtor's use of collateral and by allowing a creditor to rely on its compliance with the 
UCC filing requirements to protect its interests against junior creditors. See Inslev, 717 
P.2d at 1345-46. Inslev also recognized that in these situations, the bank can "most easily 
and least expensively" avoid these problems by not advancing funds to debtors who are 
already in default. See id. at 1346. Allowing a bank to keep proceeds seized from a 
debtor's account harms these interests no matter how "voluntary" the seizure. 
21
 Textron's statement that a transaction cannot constitute a "setoff unless it is 
involuntary is unpersuasive, as Textron cites no authority for that statement. See Tex-
tron, 579 N.W. at 52. Further, as explained in the text, the ultimate issue is not whether 
Wells Fargo's actions fit within some technical definition of "setoff," but whether Wells 
Fargo's actions are distinguishable from the bank's actions in Inslev. They are not. 
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Because this case is indistinguishable from Insley, this case is governed by Insley's 
holding that a creditor's perfected security interest takes precedence over "an unrecorded 
interest of a setting-off bank." Insley, 717 P.2d at 1346. Accordingly, Wells Fargo may 
not escape liability by claiming that it was not specifically informed that the funds at 
issue were subject to Volvo Finance's security interest.22 
b. The weight of out-of-state authority also holds that a bank is liable 
for conversion when it seizes proceeds from a debtor's account to 
repay itself for overdraft advances. 
Even if Insley were not controlling, Wells Fargo's ordinary course defense would 
still have to be rejected as a matter of law. First, under the plain language of Comment 
2(c), the defense applies only if funds are "covered into the debtor's checking account and 
paid out in the operation of the debtor's business." Former UCC 9-306, cmt. 2(c). That is 
not what happened here, as Great Basin did not make a payment to Wells Fargo. Instead, 
Great Basin merely deposited funds into its own checking account, and Wells Fargo 
automatically debited the account to repay the advances. 
In one of the seminal cases in this area, the Indiana Court of Appeals expressly 
held that the ordinary course defense could not apply without such a payment. See Citi-
In its argument, Wells Fargo cites certain "policies" discussed by the court in 
Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Bank of New England, 897 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1990), 
favoring banks over creditors. Notably, in Harley-Davidson, the court held that a bank 
was not entitled to summary judgment under the ordinary course defense on the financer's 
claim for the bank's conversion of proceeds of vehicles financed by the plaintiff, id. at 
623, so it is hard to see how that case could help Wells Fargo. More importantly, how-
ever, in Insley, the Utah Supreme Court relied on different policies, favoring the need for 
creditors to be able to rely on their UCC filings to protect their security interests, so as to 
obviate the need to police security, and ease the sale of inventory in commerce. See 
Insley, 717 P.2d at 1345-46. Once again, Insley must control. 
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zens Natl Bank v. Mid-States Dev. Co., 380 N.E.2d 1243, 1250 (Ind. App. 1978). In 
Citizens National Bank, the court held that the ordinary course defense could not apply 
when a bank seized funds directly from the depositor's account: 
In our view the security interest in proceeds continues until the funds are 
actually transferred in the ordinary course of business. Here no such 
transfers were made because of the Bank's conversion of the funds depo-
sited in Huntington's account. Thus, diminishing [the secured creditor's] 
recovery would in no way protect transferees in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Instead it would provide a windfall by placing the Bank in a better 
position than it would have been if it had not converted the bank account 
to its own use. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, without an actual payment from Great Basin to Wells Fargo, 
the ordinary course defense cannot apply. 
Further, as Volvo Finance explained in its opening brief, the weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions rejects the ordinary course defense in situations like this. See 
Bank of Brewton v. GMAC, 811 F. Supp. 648, 650-51 (S.D. Ala. 1992); C & H, 449 
N.W.2d at 876-77 (Iowa 1989); Linn Coop. Oil Co. v. Norwest Bank Marion, 444 
N.W.2d 497, 499 (Iowa 1989) ("Within the context of this conclusion, we are unable to 
conclude that the official comment accompanying section [9-306] rises to the status of a 
Code priority rule."); Citizens Natl Bank, 380 N.E.2d at 1248-50; GMAC v. Lincoln 
Natl Bank, 18 S.W.3d 337, 339-40 (Ky. 2000). See also Farmers & Merch. Natl Bank v. 
Sooner Coop., 766 P.2d 325, 330 (Okla. 1988) ("F&M's filed financing statement... 
provided sufficient information to put appellants on inquiry as to F&M's security interest 
in cash proceeds in the form of PIK benefits. Due to this knowledge, the transfer was not 
in the ordinary course of business and was subject to F&M's security interest."). Wells 
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Fargo attempts to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved "involuntary" 
setoffs, but Wells Fargo's argument is no more persuasive here than it was in Wells 
Fargo's attempt to distinguish Insley. 
Wells Fargo also asks the Court to follow J J. Case and Textron, but as explained 
above, both cases started from the premise that Comment 2(c) provided a defense, and 
neither case involved setoffs to repay overdraft advances. This last point is highly sig-
nificant because it goes directly to the equities of the situation. It may not be realistic to 
expect a bank to investigate a customer's financial condition every time the bank receives 
a payment on a pre-existing loan. But there is nothing wrong with asking a bank - like 
every other creditor - to do a little homework before lending out hundreds of thousands 
of dollars. As Wells Fargo admits, it could have done a UCC search and discovered 
Volvo Finance's interest, but it failed to do any investigation. Wells Fargo chose to loan 
money to an entity that was entirely uncreditworthy and whose assets were already 
pledged away. Justice demands that Wells Fargo bear the risk of default. 
2. Wells Fargo has not shown that the defense applies as a matter of law. 
Finally, Wells Fargo has not cited undisputed evidence entitling Wells Fargo to 
judgment as a matter of law on the ordinary course defense. There is no evidence that 
Great Basin made a "payment" to Wells Fargo in the "routine operation" of Great Basin's 
business. Ct HCC Credit Corp. v. Springs Valley Bank & Trust 712 N.E.2d 952, 958 
(Ind. 1999) (identifying elements of claim; holding that summary judgment not appro-
priate because application of defense is question of fact). In HCC, the court held that the 
debtor's payment to the bank was not in the ordinary course because the bank was aware 
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that the plaintiff had a perfected security interest in the debtor's tractor inventory, and the 
payment was unusually large. See id. at 959. 
Wells Fargo discusses at length Great Basin's "cash management system" and the 
way Great Basin normally made payments through that system (Wells Fargo Br. at 49-
50), but Great Basin did not use that system to pay Wells Fargo. Instead, Wells Fargo 
bypassed the cash management system entirely and simply took the funds straight from 
the Concentration Account. The record does not reflect a single instance, other than the 
setoffs Wells Fargo took on December 27 and 29, in which Great Basin paid a "business 
expense" directly from the Concentration Account. Thus, Wells Fargo has not esta-
blished that Great Basin repaid the overdraft advances in the routine operation of its busi-
ness. (Once again, that the transaction was out of the ordinary suggests that it would 
have been reasonable for Wells Fargo to investigate Great Basin's financial situation 
before going through with the advances.) 
Second, Wells Fargo has not established that it was unaware it was acting to 
Volvo Finance's prejudice in seizing Great Basin's funds on December 29. When Wells 
Fargo decided to cover Great Basin's overdrafts on December 27 and 28, Wells Fargo 
knew that the funds Great Basin was going to transfer to the Concentration Account were 
likely to be proceeds of Great Basin's inventory, knew that Great Basin's floor plan 
financing was provided by Volvo Finance, and knew that Great Basin's flooring obliga-
tions to Volvo Finance were secured by Great Basin's inventory. (See R. 1004-05.) 
Thus, even apart from Volvo Finance's UCC filing, Great Basin had actual knowledge of 
Volvo Finance's claim to the funds at issue. Moreover, because the funds from all twelve 
Great Basin dealerships were automatically transferred every day to the Concentration 
Account, which was overdrawn, Wells Fargo knew that none of the dealerships had any 
funds on hand. 
In HCC, the court held that the bank could not rely on the ordinary course defense 
because the bank "had extended credit to [the debtor] with the express understanding that 
HCC stood in a superior position to be repaid, at least in certain circumstances." HCC, 
712 N.E.2d at 959. The court held that it would have been a "windfall" for the bank to be 
paid ahead of the debtor's secured creditors "because the bank had no reasonable expec-
tation that [the debtor] could or would liquidate its debt due the bank in advance of pay-
ing HCC for the tractors financed — at the expense of HCC which had taken all measures 
required by the U.C.C. to protect its interest." Id. That reasoning applies here: Wells 
Fargo admits knowing that Volvo Finance had a security interest in Great Basin's inven-
tory and a superior right to repayment, and thus Wells Fargo had no "reasonable expec-
tation" that any loan it advanced to Great Basin would be paid ahead of Volvo Finance, 
which, like the secured creditor in HCC, had "taken all measures required by the U.C.C. 
to protect its interest." Id Thus, even if the ordinary course defense could apply in this 
case, there would be a genuine issue of fact as to whether Wells Fargo has met the 
requirements of that defense. 
CONCLUSION 
The case law is clear: Volvo Finance did not lose its security interest in the 
proceeds of the sales of the Volvo-Financed Vehicles simply because Great Basin trans-
ferred those funds from the Concentration Account to the First Security Account and 
_ i n . 
back. And Inslev establishes that Wells Fargo committed a conversion and was unjustly 
enriched when it seized those proceeds from the Concentration Account to repay itself for 
overdraft advances. Accordingly, the Court should reverse the grant of summary judg-
ment to Wells Fargo and allow Volvo Finance to go forward on its claims. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBITS 
11. Restatement (2d) of Trusts § 202. 
Tab 11 
Vfetlaw 
REST 2d TRUSTS § 202 Page 1 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 202 (1959) 
(Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
c 
Restatement of the Law - Trusts 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
Current through September 2004 
Copyright © 1959-2004 by the American Law Institute 
Chapter 7. The Administration Of The Trust 
Topic 4. Remedies Of The Beneficiary And Liabilities Of The Trustee 
§ 202. Following Trust Property Into Its Product 
Link to Case Citations 
(1) Where the trustee by the wrongful disposition of trust property acquires other property, the 
beneficiary is entitled at his option either to enforce a constructive trust of the property so acquired or to 
enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim against the trustee for damages for breach of trust, as 
long as the product of the trust property is held by the trustee and can be traced. 
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (1), the claim of the beneficiary against the trustee for breach of trust is 
that of a general creditor. 
See Reporter's Note. 
Comment on Subsection (1): 
a. Constructive trust or equitable lien. Where the trustee by the wrongful disposition of trust property acquires 
other property which is or becomes more valuable than the trust property used in acquiring it, the beneficiary is 
entitled to reach the property so acquired, and thus to secure the profit which arises from the transaction. Where, on 
the other hand, the property acquired is or becomes less valuable than the trust property used in acquiring it, the 
beneficiary can hold the trustee personally liable for the value of the trust property so used, and can enforce an 
equitable lien upon the property so acquired as security for his claim against the trustee, holding the trustee 
personally liable for the balance of his claim. Since the transaction is in breach of trust, the trustee is accountable for 
profits and is chargeable with losses arising therefrom. 
The advantage to the beneficiary in thus following trust property into its product is that he is enabled thereby to 
reach the profit, if any, resulting from the disposition, and that whether there is a profit or not he is enabled to obtain 
priority over the general creditors of the trustee to the extent to which he can trace trust property into the product. 
The equitable interest of the beneficiary in the product of trust property can be enforced against the trustee and 
against any third person claiming an interest in the product, unless the third person is a bona fide purchaser. See § 
284. A creditor of the trustee is not a bona fide purchaser. See § 308. 
As to the choice of remedies where there are several beneficiaries, see § 214. 
The rule stated in Subsection (1) is applicable where the trustee wrongfully sells trust property, or wrongfully 
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uses trust funds in the purchase of property, or wrongfully exchanges trust property for other property, or wrongfully 
deposits trust funds in a bank. The Statute of Frauds does not preclude the beneficiary of an oral trust of a chattel or 
chose in action which the trustee has exchanged for an interest in land from reaching the land. See § 52, Comment 
c. 
Illustrations: 
1. A is trustee for B of Blackacre. In breach of trust he sells Blackacre, and receives $10,000 which he still 
holds. B can enforce a constructive trust of the proceeds, or he can hold A liable for the value of Blackacre and 
enforce an equitable lien upon the proceeds. 
2. A is trustee for B of $10,000. In breach of trust he purchases Blackacre with the money. B can enforce a 
constructive trust of Blackacre, or he can hold A liable for $10,000 and enforce an equitable lien upon 
Blackacre. 
3. A is trustee for B of certain bonds. In breach of trust he exchanges the bonds for certain shares of stock. 
B can enforce a constructive trust of the shares of stock, or he can hold A liable for the value of the bonds and 
enforce an equitable lien upon the shares of stock. 
4. A is trustee for B of $10,000. In breach of trust A deposits the money in his individual account in a bank 
in which he has on deposit no individual funds. The bank fails and pays fifty cents on the dollar. B is entitled to 
the $5000 received from the bank, and can hold A personally liable for the balance of the $10,000. 
b. Successive transactions. The rule stated in Subsection (1) is applicable not only with respect to property 
acquired immediately through the wrongful disposition of trust property, but also with respect to property 
subsequently acquired through the disposition of the property so first acquired. This is true although there have been 
many such successive transactions, so long as it is shown that the property ultimately held by the trustee was 
acquired through the wrongful disposition of the trust property or its product. 
Illustration: 
5. A is trustee for B of Blackacre. In breach of trust A sells Blackacre for $10,000, and with $5000 of the 
proceeds he purchases Whiteacre and with the other $5000 purchases bonds. He exchanges Whiteacre to 
Greenacre. B can enforce a constructive trust of Greenacre and the bonds, or he can hold A liable for the value 
of Blackacre and enforce an equitable lien upon Greenacre and the bonds. 
As to the liability of the trustee with respect to an intermediate profit or loss, see § 213, Comment /. 
c. Aleatory transactions. The rule stated in Subsection (1) is applicable where the trustee by the wrongful 
disposition of trust property acquires other property, even though the transaction is an aleatory transaction, that is 
one involving a large element of risk of loss and possibility of profit. In such a case if there is a profit realized, the 
beneficiary is entitled to reach it; and if there is a loss he can hold the trustee personally lmble and can enforce an 
equitable lien upon the product, if any, of the trust property. 
Illustrations: 
6. A is trustee for B of $1000. He wagers the $1000 on a horse race and wins $10,000. B can enforce a 
constructive trust of the $10,000. 
7. A is trustee for B. A insures his own life for $10,000 and pays the premiums wholly with funds of the 
trust. After two years A dies. B can enforce a constructive trust of the proceeds of the policy, and is not limited 
to a lien upon the proceeds for the amount of trust funds used in paying the premiums. 
d. Acquisition of property exempt from claims of creditors. The rule stated in Subsection (1) is applicable where 
the trustee by the wrongful disposition of trust property acquires other property, even though the property so 
acquired is of such a character that it cannot be reached by general creditors of the trustee. The policy in favor of 
exempting certain property from the claims of creditors is not applicable where the property is wrongfully acquired 
with the property of another. 
Copr. © 2004 The American Law Institute. 
REST 2d TRUSTS § 202 Page 3 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 202 (1959) 
(Publication page references are not available for this document.) 
Illustrations: 
8. A, trustee for B, wrongfully takes $2000 of the trust funds and purchases a homestead which by law is 
not subject to attachment or levy on execution by his creditors. B can follow the money into the property so 
acquired and compel A to hold it in constructive trust for him, or can enforce an equitable lien upon the 
property. 
9. A is a trustee for B. A insures his own life for $10,000 and pays the premiums wholly with funds of the 
trust. After two years A dies. By statute the proceeds of life insurance policies are exempt from the claims of 
creditors of the insured. B can enforce a constructive trust of the proceeds of the policy. 
e. Proceeds of the use of trust property. The rule stated in Subsection (1) is applicable not only where the trustee 
acquires property by a wrongful sale, purchase or exchange, but also where he acquires property from the wrongful 
use of trust property. Thus, if the trustee wrongfully leases trust property, the beneficiary can enforce a constructive 
trust of or an equitable lien upon the rental received by the trustee. So also, if the trustee wrongfully uses trust 
money in his own business, or if he lends trust money to himself, the beneficiary can impose a constructive trust or 
equitable lien upon the proceeds if he can trace them. 
/ Improvements upon trustee's individual property. Where the trustee wrongfully uses trust funds to pay for 
improvements upon property owned by the trustee individually, the beneficiary is entitled to an equitable lien upon 
the property but cannot compel the trustee to hold the property upon a constructive trust for him, since the trust 
funds were not used in acquiring the property. 
Illustration: 
10. A is trustee for B of $1000. He wrongfully uses this money in making improvements upon Blackacre, 
owned by A individually. B can enforce an equitable lien upon Blackacre for $1000, but he cannot enforce a 
constructive trust of Blackacre. 
g. Discharging trustee's individual obligation. Where the trustee wrongfully uses trust funds in discharging an 
obligation owed by the trustee individually to a third person, the beneficiary is entitled to be subrogated to the rights 
which the obligee had before the obligation was discharged. A court of equity will afford relief to the beneficiary by 
putting him in the position occupied by the obligee before the obligation was discharged. If the obligation was a 
secured obligation, the beneficiary is entitled to the security interest held by the obligee. If the obligation was of 
such a character that the obligee was entitled to priority over other creditors of the trustee, the beneficiary is entitled 
to a similar priority. On the other hand, if the obligation discharged was not secured and the obligee was not entitled 
to priority, although the beneficiary is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the obligee, he does not thereby 
obtain any priority over other creditors of the trustee, and his remedy by way of subrogation is no better than that 
which he has against the trustee to recover damages for the wrongful disposition of the trust property. On the 
question of the liability of the obligee if he had notice of the breach of trust, see § § 288 and 304. 
Illustrations: 
11. A is trustee for B of $10,000. A uses the trust money in paying off a mortgage of sl0,000 upon 
Blackacre, which belongs to A individually. B is subrogated to the rights which the mortgagee had prior to the 
discharge of the mortgage. 
12. A is trustee for B of $5000. A is individually indebted to a bank in the sum of $5000, the debt being 
secured by a pledge of bonds owned by A. A uses the trust money in paying the debt. B is subrogated to the 
security interest which the bank had prior to the payment of the debt. 
13. A, trustee for B, wrongfully takes $1000 of the trust money and pays personal taxes owed by A to a 
city. Such taxes are by statute payable out of the assets of an insolvent taxpayer in priority to other claims. A is 
insolvent. B is entitled to the same priority to which the city was entitled. 
h. Mingling trust property with individual property of the trustee. Where the trustee wrongfully mingles trust 
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property with his individual property in one indistinguishable mass, the beneficiary is entitled at his option either to 
enforce a constructive trust on the mingled property in such proportion as the trust property so mingled bears to the 
whole of the mingled property, or to enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim against the trustee for the 
value of the trust property so mingled. So long as no further disposition is made of the mingled mass, and so long as 
it does not fluctuate in value, the result is the same whichever remedy is enforced by the beneficiary. 
Where the trustee exchanges the mingled mass for other property, the beneficiary is entitled at his option either 
to claim a proportionate share of the product, or to enforce an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim for 
reimbursement. Where the property is or becomes more valuable than the mingled mass with which it is acquired, 
the beneficiary is entitled to a proportionate share of the property, and thus to secure the profit which arises from the 
transaction. Where, on the other hand, the property acquired is or becomes less valuable than the mingled mass with 
which it is acquired, the beneficiary can enforce an equitable lien upon the property as security for his claim against 
the trustee. 
Illustrations: 
14. A is trustee for B of $1000. With this money and with $1000 of his own money A purchases Blackacre. 
B is entitled at his option to enforce a constructive trust as to a half interest in Blackacre, or to an equitable lien 
upon Blackacre for $1000. 
15. A is trustee for B of $1000. With this money and with $1000 of his own money A purchases shares of 
stock which he later sells for $5000. B is entitled to receive half of the proceeds. If the shares are sold for 
$1500, B is entitled at his option to an equitable lien upon the proceeds for $1000. 
16. A is trustee for B. A insures his own life for $10,000 and pays the premiums half with trust funds and 
half with money of his own. A dies. B is entitled to half of the proceeds of the policy, or at his option he is 
entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds for the amount of premiums paid with trust funds. 
/. Effect of withdrawals from the mingled mass. Where the trustee wrongfully mingles trust funds with his 
individual funds in one indistinguishable mass, and subsequently makes withdrawals from the mingled fund, the 
beneficiary is entitled to a proportionate share both in the part which remains and in the part which is withdrawn, or 
at his option he is entitled to an equitable lien upon both parts to secure his claim for reimbursement. 
Where the trustee deposits in a single account in a bank trust funds and his individual funds, and subsequently 
makes withdrawals from the bank account and dissipates the money so withdrawn, the beneficiary is entitled to an 
equitable lien upon the balance remaining in the bank for the amount of trust funds deposited in the account. It is 
immaterial in what order the deposits were made, whether the trust funds were first deposited or the trustee's 
individual funds, since there is no inference that the money first deposited is the money first withdrawn. The rule in 
Clayton's Case that withdrawals are presumed to be in the same order as that in which the deposits were made, has 
no application to this situation, where the intention of the wrongdoing trustee in making withdrawals is immaterial. 
The beneficiary's lien is not restricted to any part of the deposit but extends to the whole deposit and can be enforced 
against any part of the funds remaining on deposit and against any funds which are withdrawn, so long as they can 
be traced. So also, there is no inference that the trustee withdraws his own funds first. If the funds withdrawn are 
preserved or can be traced, the beneficiary can enforce an equitable lien upon them or their product, even though the 
funds remaining on deposit are subsequently dissipated. 
Illustrations: 
17. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money in his individual account in a bank where he has 
$1000 of his own on deposit. He draws out $1000 and buys securities. B is entitled to one-half of the securities 
and one-half of the money remaining on deposit or at his option to an equitable lien upon the securities and the 
deposit for $1000. 
18. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money in his individual account in a bank where he has 
$1000 of his own on deposit. He draws out and dissipates $1500. B is entitled to an equitable lien upon the 
balance of the deposit. 
19. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money in his individual account in a bank where he has 
$1000 of his own on deposit. He draws out $500 with which he buys securities, and subsequently draws out the 
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balance of $1500 which he dissipates. B is entitled to one-half of the securities or at his option to an equitable 
lien upon the securities for $1000. 
On the question as to whether and under what circumstances the trustee can properly separate the mingled fund 
so as to confine the beneficiary to a particular part of the fund and its proceeds, see Restatement of Restitution, § 
211, Comments. 
/ Effect of withdrawals and subsequent additions. Where the trustee deposits in a single account in a bank trust 
funds and his individual funds, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and dissipates the money so withdrawn, and 
subsequently makes additional deposits of his individual funds in the account, the beneficiary cannot ordinarily 
enforce an equitable lien upon the deposit for a sum greater than the lowest intermediate balance of the deposit. If 
the amount on deposit at all times after the deposit of the trust funds equalled or exceeded the amount of trust funds 
deposited, the beneficiary is entitled to a lien upon the deposit for the full amount of the trust funds deposited in the 
account. If after the deposit of trust funds in the account the deposit was wholly exhausted by withdrawals before 
subsequent deposits of the trustee's individual funds were made, the beneficiary's lien upon the deposit is 
extinguished, and if he is unable to trace the money withdrawn, he is relegated to a mere personal claim against the 
trustee, and is entitled to no priority over other creditors of the trustee. 
Illustrations: 
20. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money together with $1000 of his own in a bank. He draws 
out $1500 and dissipates it. He later deposits $1000 of his own in the account. B is entitled to a lien on the 
account for $500, the lowest intermediate balance. 
21. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money together with $1000 of his own in a bank. He draws 
out the whole $2000 and dissipates it. He later deposits $500 of his own. B is not entitled to a lien on the 
account. 
22. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money together with $1000 of his own in a bank. He draws 
out various amounts and makes further deposits of money of his own. The amount on deposit in the account is 
at no time less than $1000. B is entitled to a lien on the account for $1000. 
k Investment of lowest balance. Where the lowest balance is invested and earns a profit, the beneficiary can 
enforce an equitable lien not only for the amount of the lowest balance but also for the amount of the profit earned 
by it, although not for more than the total amount of the trust fund wrongfully mingled by the trustee. The 
beneficiary is entitled at his option to enforce a constructive trust as to a proportionate share of the product. 
Illustration: 
23. A, trustee for B, deposits $1000 of trust funds in his individual account in a bank, together with $1000 
of his own. A withdraws and dissipates $1500. He invests the remaining $500 in shares of stock which he sells 
for $1500. B in entitled to a lien on the proceeds for $1000. If he sells the shares for $3000, B is entitled at his 
option to enforce a constructive trust as to one-half of the proceeds or $1500. 
/. Redeposit of withdrawals. Where the amount withdrawn from the account is not dissipated but is subsequently 
redeposited in the account, the effect is the same as though the withdrawal had not been made, and the beneficiary's 
lien is not limited to the lowest intermediate balance. 
Illustrations: 
24. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money together with $1000 of his own in a bank. He 
draws out $1500 of which he dissipates $1000 and redeposits the remaining $500 in the account. B is entitled to 
a lien on the account for $1000. 
25. A is trustee for B of $1000. He deposits this money together with $1000 of his own in a bank. He draws 
out the whole $2000 with which he purchases shares of stock which he later sells for $1500 which he redeposits 
in the account. B is entitled to a lien on the account for $1000. 
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m. Subsequent additions by way of restitution. Where the trustee deposits trust funds in his individual account in 
a bank, and makes withdrawals from the deposit and dissipates the money so withdrawn, and subsequently makes 
additional deposits of his individual funds in the account, manifesting an intention to make restitution of the trust 
funds withdrawn, the beneficiary's lien upon the deposit is not limited to the lowest intermediate balance. 
Where the deposit of trust funds and of his individual funds was in an account in the name of the trustee as 
such, and not in his individual account, and he withdraws more than the amount of his individual funds, and 
subsequently deposits his individual funds in the account, the beneficiary's lien upon the deposit is not limited to the 
lowest intermediate balance since the new deposit will be treated as made by way of restitution of the trust funds 
previously withdrawn. 
n. Mingling funds of two or more trusts. Where a trustee wrongfully mingles property held by him as trustee 
under different trusts and exchanges the mingled mass for other property, the beneficiaries of the trusts are entitled 
to enforce a constructive trust on the property so acquired and are entitled to share the property proportionately. 
Illustrations: 
26. A wrongfully takes $1000 which he holds in trust for B and $2000 which he holds in trust for C, and 
with this $3000 purchases Blackacre, which he later sells for $6000. Out of the proceeds B is entitled to $2000 
and C is entitled to $4000. 
27. The facts are as stated in Illustration 26, except that A sells Blackacre for $1200. Out of the proceeds B 
is entitled to $400 and C is entitled to $800. B can also hold A personally liable for $600 and C can hold A 
personally liable for $1200. 
Where the trustee deposits in a single account funds held by him as trustee under different trusts, and 
subsequently wrongfully withdraws and dissipates a part of the deposit, the beneficiaries of the trusts are entitled to 
share the balance of the deposit proportionately, regardless of the order in which the deposits were made. 
Illustrations: 
28. A wrongfully deposits in his personal account in a bank $1000 which he holds in trust for B and $2000 
which he holds in trust for C. A draws out and dissipates $1500. Of the balance remaining B is entitled to $500 
and C is entitled to $1000. B can also hold A personally liable for $500 and C can hold A personally liable for 
$1000. 
29. A wrongfully deposits in his personal account in a bank $1000 which he holds in trust for B and $1000 
which he holds in trust for C. A has also $1000 of his own in the account. A draws out and dissipates $1500. Of 
the balance remaining B is entitled to $750 and C is entitled to $750. 
By the Uniform Trusts Act, § 15, it is provided that where a trustee mingles the funds of two or more trusts and 
subsequently makes a withdrawal for his own benefit or for the benefit of a third person or for an unknown purpose, 
such withdrawal shall be charged first to the amount of property of the trustee in the mingled funds, if any, and then 
proportionately to the several trusts. See Restatement of Restitution, § 213. 
Comment on Subsection (2). 
o. Necessity of tracing trust property. The claim of the beneficiary against the trustee for breach of trust does 
not of itself entitle him to priority over the general creditors of the trustee. Thus, if the trustee sells trust property and 
dissipates the proceeds, the beneficiary is not entitled to priority over other creditors of the trustee. The beneficiary 
is entitled to priority only if and to the extent that he can trace the trust property into a product. He must prove not 
only that the trustee once had the trust property or its product, but that he still holds the trusl property, or property 
which is in whole or in part the product of the trust property. As has been stated, the mere fact that the trust property 
or its proceeds has been mingled with the trustee's individual property in one indistinguishable mass does not 
prevent the beneficiary from following the trust property and obtaining in part at least priority over the trustee's 
general creditors. But if it is shown that the property or its proceeds has been dissipated so that no product remains, 
or if the beneficiary fails to prove that the trustee still has property into which the trust property is traceable, his 
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claim is only that of a general creditor of the trustee. 
If the trustee is also a beneficiary of the trust, the other beneficiaries are entitled to a charge upon the trustee's 
beneficial interest to secure their claims against the trustee for breach of trust. See § 257. 
Comment: 
p. Cross references. As to the power of the beneficiary to reach the trust property or its product in the hands of a 
third person, see § § 284 and 326. 
The general rule as to the following into its product of property wrongfully disposed of is not limited to trust 
property. As to the application of the rule to other wrongdoers, as well as to trustees, see Restatement of Restitution, 
§ § 202-215. 
Case Citations 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958 
Case Citations January 1959 — June 1986 
Case Citations July 1986 -- June 2003 
Reporter's Notes & Cross References through December 1958: 
REPORTER'S NOTES 
The principles as to following property into its product are applicable not only to trustees but to other fiduciaries 
and to non-fiduciaries who have wrongfully dealt with the property of another. Accordingly, the question of 
following property into its product is dealt with in the Restatement of Restitution, § § 202-215. 
For cases dealing with this matter, see 4 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.1956) § § 507- 522; Bogert, Trusts and 
Trustees, § § 921-930. 
Cross References to 
Digest System Key Numbers 
Trusts € ^ 349 
Case Citations January 1959 - June 1986: 
C.A.D.C.1969. Cit. com. i in ftn. in sup. This action arose out of a dispute over the distribution of swindled 
funds among numerous victims. The court held that the distribution of funds recovered from a confidence man who 
swindled different victims at different times and then commingled the lucre was properly distributed to the victims 
on a pro rata basis, according to their respective losses. Ruddle v. Moore, 134 App.D.C. 3,411 F.2d 718, 719. 
C.A.D.C.1977. Cit. in ftn. This was an action on a petition for involuntary reorganization of an insolvent 
corporation. Plaintiffs, investors, had invested funds in various limited partnerships that were organized to purchase 
and operate real estate holdings but such funds were diverted, without their knowledge, to purchase real estate by a 
corporation which subsequently became insolvent. Reversing the lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs complaint on 
the basis that since they were "shareholders," they were ineligible to file a petition for reorganization, the court held 
that the diversion of plaintiffs' funds created a constructive trust such that they held an equitable lien against the 
property of the corporation, and as they could be characterized as "secured creditors", they were eligible to file the 
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petition for reorganization. In re Lela & Co. Inc., 551 F.2d 399,407. 
N.D.Cal.1984. Com. (m) cit. in sup. The United States sued the former president of a bankrupt company for 
nonpayment of taxes withheld from employees' salaries. An action was also brought against the defendant's 
attorneys, who accepted payment to represent the company in the bankruptcy proceedings knowing that the 
company was incapable of meeting its obligations to the government. The attorneys moved for summary judgment, 
arguing that funds held in trust for the government could not be traced into their hands. This court denied the 
motion, holding, inter alia, that the trust funds were not depleted when an overdraft was created on the company's 
bank account, since the trust was revived by subsequent deposits specifically intended for payment of the taxes, but 
later paid to the attorneys. Alioto v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1411. 
D.Colo.Bkrtcy.Ct.1986. Corns, (i) and (j) cit. in ftn. in disc. A group of debtors brought an adversary 
proceeding for turnover and for a determination of whether the Farmers Home Administration (FrnHA) retained a 
perfected security interest in proceeds from the debtor's 1984 potato crop. The court held that the FrnHA had an 
enforceable security interest in the cash proceeds, because the proceeds were traceable to the proceeds of the 
debtor's 1983 potato crop in which the FrnHA held a perfected security interest. The court stated that, in early 1984, 
the debtors deposited the checks from the 1983 crop into the supervised account. When those funds were withdrawn, 
they were deposited into the debtor's individual checking account. Even though these funds were commingled with 
other income, they were used in large part to pay the expenses incurred by the debtors to produce the 1984 crop. In 
re Hugo, 58 B.R. 903, 908. 
E.D.Mo.1973. Quot. but dist. com. j and illus. 20, and quot. in sup. com. m. Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation, 
brought this action against the defendant, a Missouri banking corporation, contending that it had a perfected security 
interest in the proceeds of sales of certain automobiles, which proceeds were deposited in the debtor's account in 
defendant bank, and which the plaintiff alleged were thereafter permitted by the defendant to be withdrawn with the 
knowledge of the plaintiffs claim. The defendant argued that when the proceeds were deposited and thereby 
commingled with other funds in the automobile dealer's account, and thereafter substantial withdrawals were made 
exceeding the amount of the deposited proceeds, the proceeds completely lost their identity. Held: Subsequent 
deposit of funds not relating to the proceeds from the sale of the automobiles in the automobile dealer's individual 
d/b/a account were not to be treated as made by way of restitution of trust funds previously withdrawn. The court 
had examined the banking records of the automobile dealer's account and found that the identifiable proceeds in 
which the plaintiff held a continuous perfected security interest prior to the bank's $12,000 debit entry was 
$11,429.11. The plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant the excess amount debited, that amount is 
identified as proceeds in which the plaintiff had a perfected security interest, together with the 6% interest on that 
amount. Judgment for the plaintiff. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Farmers Bank of P., 358 F.Supp. 317, 325, 326. 
S.D.N.Y.1967. Com. i and illus. 19 quot. in sup. A bank misappropriated funds, funneling them to a corporation 
which later went bankrupt. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a receiver of the bank, received certain 
mortgages from the bankrupt corporation, and the trustee of the bank brought suit and charged that the corporation's 
transfers to the FDIC were illegal and invalid. The court agreed and gave judgment for the trustee. The court also 
held that the FDIC held a valid equitable lien upon the bankrupt corporation's property to the extent that the FDIC 
could trace its money, even though the money had been mingled and some of this fund then dissipated. In re Anjopa 
Paper & Board Mfg. Co., 269 F.Supp. 241,262. 
S.D.Ohio Bkrtcy.Ct.1982. Cit. in sup. The plaintiff, the transferor of stock in an oil and gas company, brought 
this action against the transferee, a Chapter XI debtor, seeking to regain the shares on the theory that the shares were 
subject to an express trust agreement between the transferor and the transferee which required the retransfer of such 
stock to the transferor. The court found that an agreement of express trust had been arrived ait prior to the transfer of 
the stock, under which the defendant was to hold one-half, that is 250 shares, of a mutually-owned company for the 
benefit of the plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the return of these shares and traced the shares 
handling by the defendant to determine the plaintiffs recovery. The court stated that the defendant subsequently 
increased the total shares in the mutually-owned company to 10,000, with 4,500 shares representing the equivalent 
of the 250 shares held in trust. After bankruptcy, the shares the defendant held in his company were exchanged at a 1 
to 10 ratio for the shares of a new company. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the imposition of a 
constructive trust upon 45,000 shares of the new company, the equivalent value of the original 250 shares of the 
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plaintiff, which under the provisions of the bankruptcy plan would otherwise be issued to the defendant. In re F.L. 
Ross Enterprises, Inc., 19 B.R. 237,250. 
Ariz.App.1966. Quot. in sup. in ftn. The plaintiff-son sought a one-fourth proportional share of the proceeds of 
the sale of stock in a closely-held corporation from the defendant, his mother. This court upheld a judgment for the 
plaintiff-son on the grounds that the transaction to purchase the father's stock for future sale to third parties made the 
defendant-mother's claim for reimbursement untimely, since it was raised after trial for the first time. Birth v. Birth, 
4 Ariz.App. 220,419 P.2d 350, 352, 353, vacated 430 P.2d 136. 
Ark. 1960. Com. j cit. in sup. A hospital bought an adjoining lot from funds some of which belonged to the 
county. It had failed to separate its accounts. The court held that since it was undisputed that even after the purchase 
price of the lot had been paid the amount remaining in the hospital's account exceeded the amount it held in trust for 
the county, the purchase was not improper, so no lien in favor of the county existed. Warren v. Wheatley, 231 Ark. 
707,331S.W.2d843,846. 
Cal.1970. Cit. in sup. by diss. B purchased property from A for $11,000, then A found a purchaser C, who 
would buy for $12,500. The title company opened only one escrow to handle both transactions. B used the proceeds 
from C to pay A, using none of his own funds. When C decided to resell he learned his title was subject to judgment 
liens against B, amounting to approximately $50,000. C had never heard of B, having transacted through agents. On 
action by C, the court held that C was liable for the liens on the theory that during the scintilla of time B owned the 
property the liens attached. Two dissents argued that C was not liable because B and his wife were trustees, since 
they had only naked title and could only pass on title to C, and no liens attached. The first dissenter relied on a 
statutory presumption of intention for a resulting trust to arise by operation of law. The second dissenter maintained 
that if B knew or should have known of the abstracts of judgment failure to disclose this fact was fraud; if B did not 
know, the transaction respecting the title conveyed by B was tainted by mutual mistake. Both fraud and mistake 
were statutory grounds for the imposition of a constructive trust. Majewsky v. Empire Construction Company, 2 
Cal.3d 478, 85 Cal.Rptr. 819,467 P.2d 547, 556. 
Cal.App.1981. Cit. in disc. The trustees of an inter vivos trust, having both marital and nonmarital trust 
features, brought this action for declaratory relief to determine the propriety of their actions after the death of the 
trustor. The trust's assets included virtually all the stock of a newspaper corporation operated by the trustor. The trust 
required that death taxes and other costs be paid from the assets of the nonmarital trust, and directed that certain of 
the nonmarital trust's stock be sold to raise these funds. The trustees sold the stock back to the corporation, setting 
the price so as to avoid heavy income and death tax burdens on the trust. Two beneficiaries under the nonmarital 
trust objected, asserting that the stock was sold at a price below its fair market value. The trial court found that the 
stock redemption price was low, and the court adjusted the trust's holdings to reflect what the respective holdings of 
the marital and nonmarital trusts would have been, had the sale been made at the proper figure. The court further 
found that while the trustees had committed no fraud, they faced conflicting interests in performing their functions 
and had breached their fiduciary duty to the nonmarital trust beneficiaries; the court ordered that they be removed as 
trustees. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's revaluation of the stock. The sale of the nonmarital trust's stock 
below its fair market value worked to the detriment of the nonmarital trust, and the trial court was correct in ordering 
a transfer of stock from the marital trust in order to make the nonmarital trust whole. The court noted that the trial 
court incorrectly labeled its remedy a constructive trust when it was actually specific reparation. The higher court 
then reversed the trial court's order removing the trustees, finding that their acts were reasonable and did not justify 
discharge. Copley v. Copley, 126 Cal.App.3d 248,178 Cal.Rptr. 842, 864. 
Fla.App.1983. Com. (h) cit. in sup. One partner in a limited partnership induced the other partner to invest an 
amount of money disproportionate to his share in the partnership by misrepresenting his own investment in the 
partnership. The trial court found that the first partner, the defendant, had defrauded the second partner, the plaintiff, 
in violation of his fiduciary obligation. The trial court ruled that the defendant held his partnership interest in a 
constructive trust for the benefit of the plaintiff, and granted the defendant's entire partnership interest to the 
plaintiff. This court affirmed the finding of fraud. However, it reversed as to the relief granted. It held that the shares 
in the partnership should have been adjusted to comport with the actual investments made by each partner. Malkus 
v. Gaines, 434 So.2d 957, 963, petition for review denied 446 So.2d 100 (Fla.1984). 
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Kan.1974. Subsec. (1) quot. in sup. in syllabus by the court, quot. and fol., com. (g) cit. in sup. Plaintiffs, 
conservators of the estate of their parents, brought suit for an accounting and for other equitable relief. The action 
was the result of misappropriation of the parents' property by the son through misuse of powers of attorney. From 
judgment for plaintiffs, appeal was taken. Where a trustee, by the wrongful disposition of trust property, acquires 
other property, the beneficiary is entitled to either enforce a constructive trust of the property so acquired, or to 
enforce an equitable trust of the property so acquired, or to force an equitable lien upon it to secure his claim against 
the trustee for damages for breach of trust. Furthermore, if the trustee, in breach of trust, transfers trust property to a 
person who takes with notice of the breach, the transferee does not hold the property free of the trust. Each 
individual misappropriation of funds by defendant constituted a separate wrongful act and breach of trust. Plaintiffs 
had the right to exercise their option with respect to each individual transaction and to elect whether to proceed by 
way of a personal judgment or to follow the trust funds into the knowingly participated-in defendant's breach of 
trust, and each transferee is responsible to the extent of his participation. Notice of the conservatorship hearing 
precluded claims that appointment of the conservators was void. Kline v. Orebaugh, 214 Kan. 207, 519 P.2d 691, 
693, 695, 696. 
Mo. 1965. Com. h cit. in sup. The plaintiff sought to establish a constructive trust over properties in the estate of 
the deceased who had falsely represented that he and the plaintiff had been legally wed and fraudulently procured 
money from her. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to trust on one-half of a farm purchased with joint 
money and to money used for general marital purposes to be satisfied out of personalty accruing during their lives 
together. McHenry v. Brown, 388 S.W.2d 797, 806. 
Mo. 1972. Cit. in sup. This was an action to impress a constructive trust for plaintiffs children on proceeds of 
three life insurance policies. Plaintiff was the former wife of deceased. Incident to their divorce, deceased made a 
contract whereby he would make their children the beneficiaries of the life insurance policies he held. Deceased, 
however, did not change the named beneficiary, and when he died the insurance companies paid the proceeds to 
defendant, deceased's mother. Defendant knew of the contract, and after suit was brought commingled the proceeds 
with her own funds. Defendant claimed that she spent the proceeds. The court held that there was a constructive 
trust, and that when the depleted account was subsequently augmented by new deposits, the resultant balance would 
be treated as trust funds available to the beneficiaries. Perry v. Perry, 484 S.W.2d 257, 259. 
Mo.App.1976. Com. (o) cit. in sup. This action was brought to impress a constructive trust on certain land. 
Although the plaintiff and the defendant had earlier agreed that legal title to the land would be taken in the plaintiffs 
name, the defendant, now an incompetent, took title in her name and refused to transfer it to the plaintiff. The trial 
court impressed the trust as prayed, and defendant, guardian of the incompetent's estate, appealed. In reversing the 
judgment on appeal, this court noted that to impress land with a trust, the money must be distinctly traced and 
clearly proved to have been invested in the land. According to the court, in must be clear that the lands have been 
paid for out of trust money. Moreover, in order to gain priority over the defendant's general creditors, the plaintiff 
had to prove that the defendant had property legally or equitably belonging to him, and that she still held that 
property. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to meet these standards of proof. Owen v. Smith, 532 S.W.2d 
538, 540. 
Mo.App.1978. Subsecs. (1) and (2) quot. in sup. and com. (o) quot. in sup. Plaintiffs., as administrators of a 
decedent's estate, instituted suit to impose an equitable lien on the assets of defendant's estate after his death. 
Plaintiffs claimed that defendant, as the executor of the decedent's estate after her death, confiscated certain of her 
funds for his personal use. The court affirmed an adverse ruling of the probate court, holding that plaintiffs were not 
entitled to an equitable lien. The stipulation of facts contained no tracing of any of the alleged trust property into the 
defendant's estate, and there was no suggestion of the comingling of defendant's personal funds. Thus appellants did 
not show that they had anything other than a general creditor's lien. In re Estate of Wittenberg, 577 S.W.2d 120,121, 
122. 
N.Y.Surr.Ct.1983. Com. (n) cit. in sup. An attorney, now deceased, settled negligence claims for six clients. 
The first three settlements were deposited in an escrow account and some money was dispersed to the clients. Later, 
three more settlements were deposited and still remained at the time of the attorney's death. The last three clients 
claimed that since their settlements were directly traceable to the escrow account, only the settlements of the first 
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three were in dispute; thus they were to receive full payment of their claims before the first three received any more 
money. The court held that, as the earlier funds were partially dissipated and could no longer be traced, the first 
three clients had become common creditors and could only share proportionately in the balance remaining after 
payment to the last three clients. Estate of Reece, 122 Misc.2d 517,470 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976. 
Or.1976. Subsec. (1) cit. in ftn. in sup. Plaintiff brought suit against her father to compel him to account for 
assets which she alleged were held by him as a trustee. From dismissal of her complaint, plaintiff appealed. The 
court reversed. As in the present case, it is enough to create a trust if the transfer of the property is made with the 
intent to vest the beneficial ownership in a third person. Defendant's purchase of stock as "custodian" for plaintiff 
was ineffectual to expend defendant's powers over the trust property from that of trustee to that of custodian. Thus, 
plaintiff was entitled to impose a constructive trust or an equitable lien upon the stock so acquired. The court went 
on to hold that a summary of trust expenditures, prepared from cancelled checks and a letter to plaintiff, was 
insufficient to meet the requirement that a trustee maintain complete and accurate records. It was, therefore, error for 
the trial court to conclude that plaintiff had received the accounting she sought. The case was thus remanded. 
Jimenez v. Lee, 274 Or. 457, 547 P.2d 126, 129. 
Tex.Civ.App.1977. Subsec. (2)(g) quot. in sup. A husband and wife sought a divorce. In accordance with the 
findings of a jury, the trial court granted the divorce and ordered the property divided. The jury made fact findings 
as to the values of community property and improvements, found that the property should be divided equally, and 
that the wife should recover $5700 in attorneys' fees from the husband. The wife appealed, and the husband cross-
appealed. They primarily complained about the classifications and the valuations assigned to the property in the 
court's judgment. The husband also contended, inter alia, that the trial court erred in its reimbursement of the 
community estate for his use of community funds to pay his separate debts. The court held that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in reimbursing the community estate for the payment of the husband's separate debts out of 
community funds. The court also held, inter alia, that the evidence supported the jury's findings as to the values of 
the community property and improvements, and that the trial court did not err in ordering that the wife should 
recover attorneys' fees from the husband and in finding that the community estate should be divided equally. 
Therefore, the trial court's judgment was affirmed. Trevino v. Trevino, 555 S.W.2d 792, 798. 
Case Citations July 1986 - June 2003: 
C.A.2, 1986. Subsec. (1), corns, (i) and (j) cit. in disc. A bank president operated a large illegal drug business 
and deposited the proceeds of this business into a correspondent bank when his bank was closed down. The 
government sued the correspondent bank seeking forfeiture of the accounts as proceeds of a drug transaction. The 
trial court issued in rem warrants for the arrest of the accounts in question. This court affirmed the issue of the 
warrants, holding that the government was entitled to use its choice of reasonable accounting methods to trace the 
flow of drug funds in accounts containing both legally and illegally obtained assets. United States v. Banco Cafetero 
Panama, 797 F.2d 1154, 1159, superseded by statute as stated in 832 F.Supp. 542 (D.N.Y.1993). 
C.A.2, 1996. Subsec. (1) quot. in ftn. Creditors of produce vendor filed suit in bankruptcy court pursuant to the 
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) seeking payment out of the proceeds derived from vendor's sale 
of his store and office units. The bankruptcy court dismissed on various grounds and the district court affirmed, 
concluding, inter alia, that the units were not part of the PACA trust because vendor acquired them prior to 
conducting any business with creditors. Vacating and remanding, this court held that a PACA trust arose upon the 
sale of produce on credit to a produce debtor, that subsequent unpaid sellers became equitable owners of the trust 
property who joined the general pool of trust beneficiaries, and that the trust, which included all produce-related 
assets regardless of their origin, ended only when each beneficiary was paid. The court noted that, to prevail on 
remand, vendor would have to show, among other things, that he did not wrongfully acquire the units with trust 
assets. In re Kornblum & Co., Inc., 81 F.3d 280, 284. 
C.A.2, Bkrtcy.App.2000. Corns, (b) and (o) cit. in disc. Chapter 7 trustee sought to avoid certain prepetition 
transfers from debtor/law firm to creditor/clients as preferences. The bankruptcy court entered judgment against 
trustee, reasoning that the payments were not preferences because they were made from funds held in trust by debtor 
for the benefit of creditors. Reversing, this court held, in part, that once creditors here had established a beneficiary-
trustee relationship with debtor, they bore the burden of tracing their property to a particular trust res in order to 
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maintain priority over other unsecured creditors. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 247 B.R. 595, 599. 
C.A.3, 1993. Com. (j) cit. in disc, com. (m) quot. in ftn. to cone, and diss. op. A gas pipeline operator in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy moved for authority to pay prepetition obligations in order to comply with Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC) tariff orders. The bankruptcy court granted the request in part and the district court 
affirmed in part. Affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding, this court held, inter alia, that customer refunds 
and upstream supplier pre-petition surcharges determined to be held in trust by the debtor so as not to be part of the 
bankruptcy estate were distributable only in an amount equal to the lowest amount in its general account on a pro 
rata basis, and the remainder of the obligations would be considered unsecured debt. A concurring and dissenting 
judge argued that the lowest intermediate balance test should not have been applied to FERC-ordered refunds to 
limit their pass-through to consumers. In re Columbia Gas Systems Inc., 997 F.2d 1039, 1063, 1066, cert, denied 
510 U.S. 1110, 114 S.Ct. 1050, 127 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994). 
C.A.4,1998. Com. (j) cit. in sup. In Chapter 11 bankruptcy action, lenders commenced adversary proceeding to 
recover escrow funds misappropriated by debtor/closing agent. The district court entered summary judgment for 
lenders on the ground that they were entitled to an express or constructive trust over their share of debtor's bank 
account. Affirming, this court held that the funds at issue were not part of the bankruptcy estate because the parties 
created an express trust in debtor to hold that property for the benefit of specified third parties, and that the amount 
of lenders' recovery would be determined in accordance with the "lowest intermediate balance" rule. In re Dameron, 
155 F.3d718, 724. 
C.A.6, 2002. Com. (m) cit. in disc. Bankruptcy estate trustee sought to avoid debtor attorney's fraudulent 
transfers from clients' escrow accounts to his commodity account, and bankruptcy court entered judgment for 
trustee. District court reversed, and this court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that debtor had no "interest in the 
property" that would subject funds held in escrow to trustee's avoidance power. Under Tennessee law the escrow 
accounts constituted express trusts and so never entered debtor's estate. When debtor deposited his personal funds 
into the escrow accounts in an attempt to repay misappropriated funds, he obtained no interest in the trust corpus 
that would allow trustee to avoid the fraudulent transfers. In re Cannon, 277 F.3d 838, 851. 
C.A.7, 1987. Cit. in disc, com. (j) cit. in disc. A creditor sued a debtor's guarantor to recover money lost after 
the debtor induced the creditor to lend money against worthless security by falsifying its sales records. The district 
court entered summary judgment for the guarantor, finding that the guarantor had effectively revoked his guaranty 
as of April 2, 1981, and that payments made by the debtor after that date extinguished the guarantor's liability. The 
court of appeals vacated and remanded, holding that the district court's application of the FIFO accounting method 
was inappropriate in this case where the debtor owed $404,000, paid $554,000, and borrowed an additional 
$407,000, because it discharged the guarantor without reducing the risk to which the creditor was exposed. The 
court directed the district court to employ either the item-by-item method or the lowest intermediate balance method, 
whichever more accurately reflected the risk to which the creditor was exposed on April 2, 1981. First Wisconsin 
Financial Corp. v. Yamaguchi, 812 F.2d 370, 375. 
C.A.7, 1992. Cit. but dist. The federal government froze funds in the principal accounts of corporations that 
manufactured and sold stereo speakers and demanded forfeiture of the sums as criminal proceeds of the 
corporations' fraudulent business operation. Affirming the district court's granting of summary judgment for the 
government, this court held that the government was entitled to the entire balance in the accounts, regardless of 
whether the corporations had become legitimate operators several months before the seizure. The court said that the 
rules of tracing mingled property did not apply in cases involving fraud in which funds had been shuffled at least in 
part to disguise their source and noted that even if the fraud had stopped by the time of the seizure, the criminal 
proceeds far exceeded the sums on deposit at that time. U.S. v. $448,342.85, 969 F.2d 474,477. 
C.A.9, 1991. Com. (m) cit. in ftn. The trustee of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate filed a complaint to recover 
funds transferred by the debtor trade school to the government as an avoidable preference. The debtor had not made 
all the disputed transfers within the 90-day period before the filing of its bankruptcy petition as required by the 
Bankruptcy Code for the exercise of the trustee's avoidance powers. The bankruptcy court entered summary 
judgment for the trustee, holding that the transferred funds were the property of the debtor so that the transfer 
operated to diminish the funds to be used to pay the bankruptcy creditors. The district court affirmed. Affirming in 
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part and reversing in part, this court held that the debtor's funds deposited in the government's trust account before 
the 90-day preference period could not be avoided by the trustee as a preference; however, the transfer of nontrust 
funds within the 90-day period constituted an avoidable preference under the Bankruptcy Code. In re California 
Trade Technical Schools, Inc., 923 F.2d 641, 646. 
D.Conn.Bkrtcy.Ct.1995. Com. (j) cit. in disc. A Chapter 11 debtor and a trustee sued to avoid the transfer of a 
debtor's payment to a law firm, alleging that law firm's receipt of the sum constituted a fraudulent transfer. Relying 
on the intermediate balance rule, defendant alleged that plaintiffs could not trace and identify the funds transferred 
to defendant as debtor's funds. This court granted in part the law firm's motion for summary judgment, but held, 
inter alia, that a material issue of fact existed as to whose monies were in debtor's bank account, precluding 
summary judgment on the issue of whether the plaintiffs seeking to impose a constructive trust on money in the 
account could trace and identify the transferred funds. In re Colmark I Ltd. Partnership, 189 B.R. 253, 256. 
D.Conn.Bkrtcy.Ct.1999. Com. (b) cit. in disc. Trustee of a Chapter 7 estate of a debtor law firm sued to 
recover, as alleged preferences, payments that the law firm had made to clients prepetition. This court held that the 
funds transferred to defendant clients by the debtor within the preference period were impressed with a trust for their 
benefit. As such, the transfer of those funds was not a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, and 
consequently could not form the basis for preference avoidance by plaintiff. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 237 
B.R. 544, 550, reversed 247 B.R. 595 (2d Cir.BAP 2000). 
D.Conn.Bkrtcy.Ct.2000. Com. (b) cit. in disc. Bankruptcy trustee for debtor law firm brought a series of 
avoidance actions against parties who received funds from debtor within the preferential transfer "look-back 
window" of Bankruptcy Code. Defendants claimed to have had a trust relationship with the debtor with respect to 
the funds. This court denied trustee's motion for summary judgment, holding, inter alia, that fact issues existed as to 
whether an express trust was created. Assuming that an express trust was created, it was not appropriate that 
defendants bear the burden of tracing their funds, since by transferring funds back to defendants on request, the 
debtor-trustee had essentially and presumptively traced the funds for defendants. In re Carrozzella & Richardson, 
255 B.R. 267, 275. 
N.D.Iowa Bkrtcy.Ct.1989. Subsec. (1) cit. in sup. After a debtor deposited $25,000 in his life insurance 
policy, declared bankruptcy, and claimed the policy as exempt to its full value, a trustee and two creditors filed 
objections to the claim of exemption. Sustaining the objections, the court held that, because the debtor intentionally 
converted cash proceeds of collateral secured to a creditor into life insurance contrary to their agreement, he was not 
entitled to claim the cash value attributable to the proceeds as exempt. In re Rodemeyer, 99 B.R. 416,424. 
D.Me.Bkrtcy.Ct.1995. Com. (j) cit. in disc. Chapter 7 trustee objected to assertion of debtor that his interest in 
a realty trust was excluded from the bankruptcy estate. The court held, inter alia, that, because the trust was self-
settled, its spendthrift transfer restrictions were unenforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law and debtor's 
interest in the trust was not protected from involuntary transfer at the behest of his creditors; thus, debtor's beneficial 
interest in the trust was part of the bankruptcy estate. In re Spenlinhauer, 182 B.R. 361, 363. 
E.D.Mich.Bkrtcy.Ct.1993. Cit. in disc. Subcontractor filed an adversary proceeding against debtor-contractor, 
seeking recovery of alleged trust funds that it claimed were not assets of debtor's estate. Denying the claim, the court 
held that, since subcontractor failed to adequately trace payment by customer to debtor that was intended for 
subcontractor's benefit to any funds remaining in a commingled bank account of payments held in trust for other 
subcontractors, the funds were assets of debtor's estate. Matter of Michigan Boiler & Engineering Co., 171 B.R. 565, 
573. 
E.D.Mo.2003. Corns, (i)-(m) cit. in disc, illus. 20 quot. in ftn. Creditor sued bank for a declaratory judgment 
and asserted claims for conversion, tortious interference with contract, and unjust enrichment, inter alia, alleging that 
bank's sweeping of funds from debtor's bank account to pay down its line of credit was wrongful because it 
interfered with plaintiffs first priority security interest in cash proceeds of plaintiffs collateral. This court granted 
plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on conversion claim, holding, inter alia, that, based on equities, 
judicial authority, and policies inherent in encouraging parties to obtain secured financing, plaintiff could use 
lowest-intermediate-balance rule to trace its cash proceeds into debtor's bank account; thus, plaintiffs security 
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interest in proceeds of its inventory collateral properly attached. General Electric Capital Corp. v. Union Planters 
Bank, N.A., 290 B.R. 676, 682. 
E.D.N.Y.1993. Subsec. (1), com. (j) cit. in disc. The government sued for forfeiture of all funds on deposit in 
various bank accounts and properly traceable to them, alleging that this money had been derived from money 
laundering operations following illegal drug transactions. This court, denying one claimant's motion for summary 
judgment but granting another claimant's motion in part, held, inter alia, that, in seeking to forfeit money allegedly 
derived from money laundering, the government was not required to prove that the funds subject to forfeiture were 
the identical funds involved in the money laundering, so that the claimants could not use a "zeroing out" argument to 
immunize substitute funds from seizure. If, however, said the court, the forfeiture was predicated on funds being 
proceeds from, or traceable to, narcotics violations and if the seized account had "zeroed out" after the violations, 
funds in the account were no longer subject to forfeiture. U.S. v. All Funds Presently on Deposit, 832 F.Supp. 542, 
552. 
S.D.N.Y.Bkrtcy.Ct.1987. Com. (1) cit. in disc. An unincorporated group of insurers sought to reclaim monies 
paid to a debtor/owner of a vessel pursuant to an insurance agreement after the debtor recovered additional funds for 
the vessel from the Panama Canal Commission. This court found for the plaintiffs, holding that they were entitled to 
the payment received from the commission through the doctrine of constructive trust. However, the court refused to 
create an administrative priority for the plaintiffs, since the funds held in trust were disbursed post-petition and 
could not be traced. In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 79 B.R. 542, 545, 546. 
D.S.D.1996. Cit. in headnotes, com. (j) cit. in disc. Cattle seller sued bank for conversion after bank set off 
funds from cattle buyer's account to satisfy buyer's debt to it, then dishonored two checks he wrote seller. When the 
jury returned a $216,000 verdict for seller, bank moved for judgment as a matter of law arguing, among other things, 
that the lowest intermediate balance rule should be used in order to prove exactly which funds were used to set off 
buyer's debt. Denying the motion, the court held, inter alia, that it would not apply the lowest intermediate balance 
rule where bank raised the issue for the first time on appeal. Moreover, even if the issue were timely raised, bank 
presented no evidence tending to show that the rule was followed in this jurisdiction. Meyer v. Norwest Bank Iowa, 
Nat. Ass'n, 924 F.Supp. 964, 966, 970, reversed 112 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.1997). 
Cal.App.1993. Corns, (j) and (k) cit. in disc. Third parties claimed interest in joint account of debtor and 
creditor that had a perfected security interest in collateral, contending that debtor so commingled proceeds from sale 
of collateral with other funds that they were not identifiable. The trial court held that third parties had right to levy 
against funds and that their claims had priority over creditor's. This court denied creditor's petition for writ of 
mandate, stating that debtor did not deposit proceeds from sale of collateral into joint account directly but wrote 
checks against its general operating account. It explained that at the time debtor wrote the checks, there were no 
proceeds from sales of collateral in the general operating account; those funds, together with any other funds 
deposited had been used to reduce the general operating account's deficit. It held that debtor deposited funds in 
general operating account to reduce that account's overdraft balance and that bank honored overdrafts by advancing 
its own funds; therefore funds deposited into joint account were not proceeds of any sales of collateral but were 
funds loaned by bank. Chrysler Credit. Corp. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.App.4th 1303,22 Cal.Rptr.2d 37,45. 
Ky.App.1992. Quot. in sup., com. (o) quot. in sup. Creditors of a car dealership filed a declaratory judgment 
action seeking to determine priorities of distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the dealership's assets. The trial 
court imposed constructive trusts in favor of certain creditors for payments the dealership never remitted to them, 
and held that tax liens did not have priority over the trusts because the trusts' proceeds were not property in the 
dealership's possession subject to the liens. Reversing and remanding, this court held that the trial court erred when 
it did not require the unremitted payments to be traced into specific assets of the dealership before imposing the 
constructive trusts. On remand the court was to take proof as to the tracing of all misappropriated funds for which a 
constructive trust was to be imposed, and the tax liens were to have priority over the constructive trusts because the 
trusts did not come into existence until created by the trial court. Cabinet for Human Res. v. Security of Am., 834 
S.W.2dl76, 180. 
Me. 1994. Com. (j) cit. in disc, and in ftn., com. (m) cit. in ftn. but dist, com. (n) cit. in sup.; illus. 20-22 cit. in 
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ftn., illus. 28 and 29 cit. in sup. A secured creditor sued a bank for conversion, alleging wrongful setoff of funds 
deposited in a commingled checking account to satisfy the bank's own secured loan. Vacating the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment for plaintiff that awarded damages based on the "lowest intermediate balance" rule and 
remanding with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff for a lesser amount, this court held that, as both plaintiff 
and defendant had a security interest in the account's proceeds and there was no priority dispute between them, the 
proper measure of damages was through application of the rule on a pro rata basis, notwithstanding plaintiffs 
contention that this assumed that the parties were equally innocent. Recognition of both creditors' interests required 
continuous prorating of the account balance to prevent one creditor from receiving a windfall. Bombardier Capital v. 
Key Bank of Maine, 639 A.2d 1065, 1067,1068. 
Mont. 1993. Subsec. (1) cit. in sup., com. (j) quot. in sup. As a loan condition, borrower secured obligation to 
bank with financial guarantee bond issued by insurer. Borrower gave insurer a $250,000 retained deposit, which was 
placed in insurer's general operating account. The court ordered defendant into liquidation in 1985, and borrower 
filed claim with liquidator for retained deposit, asserting preference over other creditors' claims. The trial court 
appointed a referee, who recommended that plaintiffs deposit be given Class 4 priority treatment under state law. 
The trial court adopted referee's recommendations and held that plaintiffs trust property was extinguished. This 
court affirmed, holding that when defendant's general operating account reached the lowest intermediate balance in 
1984, plaintiffs trust funds in the account were dissipated and its right to preferential claim against defendant was 
extinguished as well. It noted that plaintiff did not show that its funds were commingled with or used to purchase 
any other assets. Bennett v. Glacier General Assur. Co., 259 Mont. 430, 857 P.2d 683, 685-687. 
Okl.App.1990. Cit. in sup. § § 202-213. After making a demand on cotrustees, who were also residuary 
beneficiaries, for an accounting and distribution of trust monies and receiving no response, the primary beneficiaries 
of a testamentary trust sued the cotrustees for an accounting of trust assets, their removal as cotrustees, appointment 
of a new trustee, restitution of fees wrongfully paid by the cotrustees to themselves, and actual and punitive damages 
for fraud and gross negligence. The trial court found that the defendants had embezzled and converted trust property 
to their own use and had paid themselves unreasonable fees. Moreover, they had intentionally misinformed one 
plaintiff regarding the existence of the trust and his status and/or rights as a beneficiary thereof. The court removed 
the defendants, appointed a successor, ordered restitution to the trust, and awarded actual and punitive damages 
against the defendants. Affirming, this court held that there was no reversible error of law and that the trial court's 
findings of fact were supported by sufficient competent evidence and noted that the defendants' profession of good 
faith and/or reliance on advice of counsel did not constitute a defense to the action. Robinson v. Kirbie, 793 P.2d 
315,318. 
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